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THE ARRIVAL OF THE “HAVE-NOTS”
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Catherine A. Rogers*
In its classical form, international arbitration is an idealized archetype of
alternative dispute resolution.1  It is the result of two sophisticated parties with
relatively equal bargaining power who individually negotiate an agreement to
resolve their dispute.  They consent to this mechanism because it offers signifi-
cant advantages over national court adjudication.  Specifically, international
arbitration provides a neutral forum with flexible procedures that are preferable
to the presumed bias of the courts of the parties’ home jurisdictions.  In this
idealized version, there are no homespun consumers, no vulnerable employees,
and no injured tort victims.  But this image of international arbitration is
becoming more complex against the backdrop of a new global reality.  In recent
years, Internet commerce has brought consumers to the international market, an
increasingly globalized workforce has generated a class of international
employees, and the link between international trade and human rights has
revealed a host of victims.  The arrival of these “have-nots” in international
arbitration means that its idealized visage is no longer the only face of interna-
tional arbitration.  As a result, previously latent questions about international
arbitration’s integrity as a system and role as a mechanism for transnational
regulatory governance have been brought to the fore.
Against the backdrop of these developments, this Article has two pur-
poses.  First, I examine the treatment of these new arrivals in international arbi-
tration, using experiences in the domestic and the investment arbitration
contexts as a backdrop for comparison.2  These other examples illustrate that
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1 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration:  The Case Against Enforcement of Exec-
utory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449,
462-64 (1996) (noting that historical common law model of arbitration was solely in a com-
mercial context); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:  Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 1015-24 (1999) (describing the
“guild model” of arbitration).
2 In this Article, I use “international arbitration” to refer to individually negotiated “non-
specialized arbitration between private parties” who are involved in international transac-
tions. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law:  An Empirical Look
at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 530 (2005).  While this form is
often referred to as “international commercial arbitration,” I avoid this term here to avoid
341
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there are two essential concerns with parties such as consumers, employees and
tort or human rights victims in arbitration.  First, there is a procedural concern
that they are disadvantaged in relation to their opportunities in an alternative
judicial forum.  Second, there is a substantive concern that national law and
policies designed to protect them will not be adequately enforced, or enforced
at all.  My comparison suggests that, while some of these concerns may be
warranted in domestic and investment arbitration, they do not have the same
force in international arbitration.  Have-nots in domestic and investment arbi-
tration have revealed and exacerbated structural weaknesses in those systems
and produced unanticipated shifts in governmental or sovereign power to pri-
vate arbitrators.  The international arbitration community, by contrast, has an
opportunity to engage in “deliberative construction”3 before these new parties
are fully integrated and to continue to enhance its potential to contribute to
effective transnational regulation.
A second, more implicit purpose of this Article is to promote a clearer
understanding of the similarities and differences between U.S. domestic arbitra-
tion and the international arbitration system.4  If domestic and international
arbitration were living organisms, most would assume that they originated as
identical Siamese twins, laboriously separated from their co-joined birth in one
of those dramatic televised operations.  According to this legend, once
detached, they went on to pursue the same job in different locales, but each
would always retain the genealogy, matching features, and, most importantly,
common purpose of its severed other half.  This mythology of shared paternity
has resulted in scholarly neglect of the differences5 and in judicial confusion
between the legal regimes that govern the two contexts.6  The arrival of the
have-nots in each context accentuates some of these differences and their impli-
cations for the functioning of arbitration in the respective contexts.
confusion with the discussion, infra notes 135-137, regarding the definition of “commer-
cial.”  I use the term “domestic arbitration” to refer to arbitration that occurs between citi-
zens or residents of the same nation and is governed by domestic arbitration law.  By
“investment arbitration,” I refer to arbitration of a dispute between a foreign investor and a
state in which the arbitration agreement derives from an investment treaty, instead of a spe-
cific contract between the parties.
3 This term is borrowed from Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-
National Systems:  The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 144-46 (2001).
4 In this Article, unless otherwise specified, I use the term “domestic arbitration” to refer to
domestic arbitration in the United States.
5 There are scant few articles that engage in a meaningful comparison of the two contexts.
See Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233 (2006); Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration
and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 449 (2005).
6 As described later, in extending arbitrability doctrines to domestic arbitration, courts sim-
ply ignored the differences between international and domestic contexts. See infra notes 22-
33 and accompanying text.  Similarly, courts have been known to directly apply the FAA
and domestic arbitration standards to international awards, which should instead be reviewed
under the standards of the New York Convention. See Lucy Reed & Phillip Riblett, Expan-
sion of Defenses to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards in U.S. Courts?, 13 SW. J.
L. & TRADE AM. 121, 122 (2006) (discussing the potential for “mission creep” if U.S. courts
apply the domestic “manifest disregard” standard to international awards).
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In his groundbreaking 1974 article, Mark Galanter argued that the “haves”
enjoy certain systematic advantages in litigation because they are generally
repeat players7 who gain knowledge and can employ long-term litigation strate-
gies that the “have-nots” cannot typically because they are one-shot players.8
According to many scholars, not only does the distinction between haves and
have-nots carry over to arbitration, but it is dramatically amplified there.9
Employers, manufacturers, creditors, landlords, doctors, and insurance compa-
nies can fundamentally order the arbitration process to preclude many of the
procedural opportunities that aid one-shot players in the litigation context.  For
example, in domestic U.S. litigation, one-shot players benefit from broad dis-
covery, but in arbitration repeat players can effectively exclude such discovery
through careful drafting of an arbitration clause.10  One of the most serious
charges is that repeat players enjoy an advantage in the arbitral decision maker.
Unlike judges, arbitrators only earn money if they are appointed by parties.
Because one-shot players are unlikely to re-appoint an arbitrator in the future,
the argument goes, arbitrators have an incentive to favor repeat players in the
hopes that a favorable award will translate into future appointments.11
When arbitration, both domestic and international, was exclusively
between commercial parties, none of these concerns carried much weight.
Commercial parties could agree to virtually any procedural arrangement they
wanted, subject only to extreme abuses that were protected against at the award
enforcement stage.12  With regard to the substantive outcome, no one much
7 A repeat player is a litigant “which has had and anticipates repeated litigation, which has
low stakes in the outcome of any one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-
run interests” through cumulative outcomes.  Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98 (1974).
One-shot players, on the other hand, “are usually smaller units and the stakes represented by
the tangible outcome of [a single] case may be high relative to total worth.” See id.
Although often aligned, it is not necessarily true that one-shot players are “have-nots” occu-
pying an underdog position.  As will be illustrated in the discussion infra Part I.B. of invest-
ment arbitration, legal expertise can mediate the experience of one-shot players, just as labor
union representation can bestow on employees the advantages of repeat player status.
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:  The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?:  Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 19 (1999).
10 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s Pref-
erence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 680-86 (1996).  Arbitration clauses
by definition preclude access to a civil jury, which can also mollify the repeat player effect.
Carefully drafted clauses can also limit or eliminate the availability of particular remedies,
divide the cost of the proceedings, and in practice limit available discovery. See id.
11 See Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability:  Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory
Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1316-24 (2000).
12 The limits on what commercial parties can agree to are considered to be so minimal that
courts sometimes invoke patently absurd examples to illustrate them. See, e.g., Baravati v.
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that “short of
authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of three monkeys, parties
can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern the arbitration of their disputes”);
Team Design v. Gottlieb, 104 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (reasoning that, as
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cared whether Company A or Company B was found to have breached the
contract.  Every system has some mandatory contract rules, such as duress,
unconscionability, and incapacity, which parties are not supposed to be able to
contract around.13  These rules, however, are primarily designed to ensure fair-
ness and protect weaker parties to a contract,14 and so were of little importance
when the disputants were two companies.
Some larger regulatory concerns also arise in private commercial transac-
tions because they can produce negative externalities that harm third parties.
As a result, states have adopted mandatory rules to protect against such harms,
including rules that treat as void contracts that are illegal or against public
policy, and laws prohibiting such things as anti-competitive behavior, securities
fraud, corruption, and the like.  The substantive outcomes of disputes involving
these sorts of claims matter beyond the parties to the immediate dispute, which
means it begins to matter whether Company A or Company B prevails, and
why.  With the arrival of have-nots into historically commercial arbitration set-
tings, other regulatory interests such as consumer protection, environmental
protection, employment law, tort law, and human rights have also been brought
into the fold.
The substantive outcomes of these claims also matter beyond the parties to
the immediate dispute, but combine with new concerns about procedural fair-
ness, which had been largely assured in commercial contexts by the parties’
equal bargaining power.  Consequently, it is not surprising that the arrival of
have-nots in domestic U.S. arbitration sparked a vibrant debate about how well
the mechanism can ensure procedural fairness or provide correct substantive
outcomes in cases that implicate public policy.  The ultimate outcome of that
debate, and one of the few things that both sides of the debate appear to agree
on, is that in the domestic context, arbitration has had a substantial deregulatory
effect.15
The thesis of this Article is that international arbitration has not had, and
need not have, a similar deregulatory effect with respect to these types of
claims.  Instead of a net deregulatory effect, international arbitration has the
capacity to serve as a venue for mediating between conflicting national public
policies, promoting effective transnational regulation, and facilitating interna-
tional governance with respect to those regulatory policies that are designed to
long as they are agreed to by competent parties who are “dealing at arm’s length,” even
procedures such as “flipping a coin, or, for that matter, arm wrestling” will be upheld).
13 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
14 See id. at 88 (describing general consensus that mandatory restrictions on freedom of
contract are justified by paternalistic efforts to protect parties to the contract).
15 The two sides, of course, differ regarding whether deregulation is a good or bad thing.
See Kenneth S. Abraham & J.W. Montgomery, III, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 CONN.
INS. L.J. 355, 357 (2003); Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the “National Policy” of
the Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259 (2002); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to
Protect Big Business:  Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbi-
tration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 62; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Con-
sumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules
from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 710-
12 (1999).
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protect the interests of the have-nots.16  Realizing these goals and, more impor-
tantly, avoiding the pitfalls of domestic and investment arbitration will necessa-
rily require active efforts to accommodate these new types of claims.
In advancing this thesis, this Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I
describes the arrival of have-nots in domestic and investment arbitration.  In
domestic arbitration, the arrival of the have-nots can be viewed as a phased
process of judicial opening, repeat-player excess, and reformist retrenchment.
This pattern, with some important distinctions, is echoed in investment arbitra-
tion.  As with domestic arbitration, the result has been a vigorous debate
regarding both the procedural fairness and legitimacy of the process, as well as
its ability to protect sovereign interests of those states that are parties.
Against the backdrop of these comparisons, the international arbitration
context stands in marked contrast.  As the have-nots arrive, two important fea-
tures of the international arbitration system have produced a significantly dif-
ferent experience and may create a genuinely hospitable environment for
resolving disputes.  First, as a result of its history and the ethos of its partici-
pants, as well as the pragmatic necessities around which it is constructed, the
international arbitration system appears to have a more public-oriented
approach to the process of resolving disputes.  Second, the legal framework that
orders the system has combined with substantive variations among national
laws to prevent some of the most controversial practices of U.S. arbitration and
to create the possibility of regulatory arbitrage by have-nots.  As a result of
these features, instead of the pendulum swing of the domestic and investment
arbitration paradigms, in international arbitration the competing interests have
an opportunity to operate in tandem to ensure that disputes involving have-nots
expand and enhance the system, rather than detract from its legitimacy and
operation.
Despite these positive indicators, it would be too easy to assume a happy
ending for the have-nots in international arbitration.  The international arbitra-
tion system has work to do to ensure that they will be adequately accommo-
dated.  In Part III, I consider in Section A the need for structural reforms for the
international arbitration system to accommodate consumers and employees.  In
Section B, I assess what effects these new claims might have on the market for
arbitration services and in particular on the community of international arbitra-
tors.  Finally, in Section C, I consider how international arbitration might medi-
ate between competing national policies and contribute to the development of
international norms in the complex areas of human rights and seamen’s claims.
16 For a thoughtful analysis of how international arbitration and private international law
norms can promote a transnational regulatory function, see Robert Wai, Transnational Pri-
vate Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 471
(2005).  For arguments contending that international arbitration is “lawless,” see Philip J.
McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness:  A “Second Look” at International
Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 453 (1999); Linda Silberman, Interna-
tional Arbitration:  Comments From a Critic, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 9, 11 (2002).
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I. THE HAVE-NOTS IN DOMESTIC AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
This Part tracks the pattern of domestic U.S. arbitration, and later invest-
ment arbitration, in accommodating repeat players and one-shot players.  The
pattern in the domestic context can be divided into three phases:  an enthusias-
tic expansion or opening of arbitration by courts, perceived abuse by repeat
players, and (at least partial) retrenchment on behalf of the have-nots.  While
this three-phase paradigm is a useful heuristic device, it is not meant to obscure
the fact that all three trends are present in all three phases.  The division repre-
sents an effort to identify which actors—courts, repeat players, or reformists—
are the primary protagonists at different points in time in the domestic context.
In investment arbitration, the reasons for and protagonists in this pattern of
openness, excess, and retrenchment are somewhat different.  The overall pat-
tern, however, remains quite similar and reveals related concerns about proce-
dural legitimacy and the loss of sovereignty (comparable to the deregulatory
effect in the domestic context).
A. The Paradigm in Domestic Arbitration
The modern contours of U.S. arbitration bear little resemblance to its his-
torical profile.  Up through the early part of the twentieth century, merchants
from “shared normative communities” welcomed arbitration as an efficient and
effective mechanism for resolving business disputes.17  Courts resisted arbitra-
tion as a threat to their jurisdiction and, as a consequence, arbitration agree-
ments were routinely voided and arbitral awards were subject to intense judicial
scrutiny or rewriting.18  Legislatures were also hostile, with many states enact-
ing statutes that rendered arbitration agreements unenforceable.19  To promote
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards, in 1925 Congress adopted
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  Even with the passage of the FAA, how-
ever, arbitration remained largely the province of commercial parties, and that
province was bounded by restrictions against arbitration of certain types of stat-
utory claims.  Some years later, a line of Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the FAA identified and developed a “federal policy favoring arbitration,”20
which opened the door for abuses that would follow and the retrenchment those
abuses would provoke.
1. The Judicial Opening of Arbitration
Three major judicial developments transformed arbitration from a mecha-
nism for commercial disputes into its modern profile.  First, the Supreme Court
dramatically—some argue unduly—expanded the types of claims that could be
arbitrated.  Judicially created doctrines of non-arbitrability had prevented arbi-
tration of statutory claims that are imbued with public policy, such as securities
fraud, antitrust, and employment discrimination.  In the framework of this Arti-
17 Van Wezel Stone, supra note 1, at 1017.
18 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice:  The Demise of Due Process in American Law,
70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1948 (1996); Mara Kent, “Forced” vs. Compulsory Arbitration of
Civil Rights Claims, 23 LAW & INEQ. 95 (2005).
19 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
20 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
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cle, it strikes an ironic note that the path to apparently boundless arbitrability in
domestic arbitration started with international cases.  In Scherk v. Alberto-Cul-
ver Co.,21 the Supreme Court reversed earlier precedent that had held securities
fraud claims to be non-arbitrable.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted
that “uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract touch-
ing two or more countries” and reasoned that “[a] contractual provision speci-
fying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to
be applied is . . . an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the
orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transac-
tion.”22  Later in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,23
the Supreme Court again overturned prior precedent, emphasizing the impor-
tance of arbitration to international trade.  Quoting from an earlier opinion in a
case involving a forum selection clause, the Mitsubishi Court emphasized:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, not-
withstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . .  We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, gov-
erned by our laws, and resolved in our courts.24
As this reasoning suggests, international disputes do present unique reasons to
permit arbitration of statutory claims, even those that implicate important pub-
lic policies.  But these reasons do not necessarily apply, or do not apply with
equal force, to arbitration of purely domestic claims.
In international cases, national courts are burdened with competing asser-
tions of prescriptive and judicial jurisdiction from other nations, and national
court judgments face significant obstacles to enforcement abroad.25  As a con-
sequence, one nation’s assertion that a particular law is “mandatory” does nec-
essarily not make it inescapable if another nation adjudicates the case or refuses
to enforce a resulting judgment.26  In other words, the transnational regulatory
environment is less certain and less clearly bounded than the domestic environ-
ment.  As a result, permitting claims to be arbitrated in international cases does
not necessarily produce a net deregulatory effect as it does in the domestic
context, where there is little or no doubt about what law courts would apply and
no need for them to accommodate the regulatory interests of other sovereigns.27
Notwithstanding these distinctions, the Supreme Court’s early arbitrability
decisions soon slipped from their international moorings, and subsequent juris-
prudence drifted into an apparently boundless permissiveness for arbitration of
21 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
22 Id. at 516.
23 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
24 Id. at 629 (emphasis added) (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9
(1972)).
25 Gary Born refers to these problems collectively as “the peculiar difficulties and uncertain-
ties of international litigation.” See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript ch. 2, at 47-48, on file with author).
26 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age:  Public Inter-
ests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219, 225 (2001).
27 The actual consequences of international arbitration on national regulatory interests will
be taken up later in Part II.B.
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any type of claim in wholly domestic settings.28  Later cases, particularly in
lower courts, casually extended these early international holdings to domestic
contexts with little or no comment regarding the different practical considera-
tions or regulatory interests implicated.29  Now, not only international, but also
domestic securities fraud and antitrust claims are arbitrable, along with RICO
claims,30 employment discrimination claims,31 and sexual harassment claims.32
As noted above, both supporters and critics agree that this expansion of arbi-
trability has a deregulatory effect, effectively privatizing adjudication and law-
making in these areas.33
The second important judicial development was the reconceptualization of
consent.  Courts have consistently held that arbitration is founded on consent34
and party autonomy.35  By emphasizing the parties’ voluntariness in agreeing
to submit their disputes to arbitration, courts justified their conclusions that
parties could not later complain that arbitration lacked all the procedural advan-
tages that they would have enjoyed in litigation, such as broad discovery, a
civil jury, and appellate review.36
Despite the stated importance of consent in legitimating the arbitral pro-
cess, courts have since systematically downgraded the consent requirement.
This transition was facilitated by the fact that the FAA does not require a
signed writing for an arbitration agreement to be effective.  In the absence of
28 See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). McMahon has
unequivocally extended arbitrability of securities claims to domestic arbitration, without any
mention of the fact that the Scherk decision had so heavily relied on the international nature
of the transaction to justify its outcome.
29 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Chi. Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[I]t seems
unlikely after McMahon that the principle of Mitsubishi can be confined to international
transactions.”); Smokey Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 785 F.2d 1274, 1282 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that “[a]lthough Mitsubishi arose in an
international antitrust dispute and its holding purports to be limited to that context, we
believe that its broad language may carry significance for domestic disputes as well”).  The
different practical considerations and regulatory interests are taken up infra Part II.
30 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238-42 (holding RICO claims are arbitrable).
31 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that an employ-
ment discrimination claim under the ADEA is arbitrable).  In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the FAA applies to all employ-
ment contracts, except in the transportation industry.  In light of Adams, the Ninth Circuit
was forced to abandon its view, unique among the circuits, that Gilmer did not apply to Title
VII claims. See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003).
32 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
33 See supra note 15.
34 See Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre) (As) sumed “Consent” of Commercial Binding
Arbitration Contracts:  An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional
Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 589, 589 (2003) (“American courts have emphasized the
‘voluntary’ nature of the parties’ consent to substitute arbitration in lieu of litigation.”).
35 See Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights:  An Approach to the
Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (1987) (“[T]he legitimacy of arbitral
proceedings flows directly from a vision of private autonomy as the conceptual basis of
contract law.”).
36 See, e.g., Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984)
(reasoning that even if “not contemplated by the [plaintiffs] when they signed the contract,
loss of the right to a jury trial is a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement
to arbitrate”).
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this requirement, which as explained in Part II differs from that in the interna-
tional context,37 courts have interpreted the concept of consent broadly.  Under
these interpretations, valid consent has been found in contracts of adhesion
where the arbitration clause is made known only after the agreement has been
completed and with no opportunity to object or withdraw.  It is this relaxed
notion of consent that has led to the development of the so-called “shrink-
wrap” and “click-wrap” arbitration agreements.  In a shrink-wrap agreement,
according to its terms, the opening of the cellophane wrapping on the boxed
software constitutes the act of assent, thus binding the purchaser to the terms
included inside the box, including the arbitration agreement.38
The third judicial development that laid the foundation for modern U.S.
arbitration practice was the broad application of federal preemption to the
FAA.39  In Southland Corp. v. Keating,40 the Supreme Court eliminated the
possibility for states to designate certain categories of claims as non-arbitra-
ble.41  The Court held in Southland that the FAA prevented the anti-waiver
provision designed to protect franchisees in the California Franchise Invest-
ment Law from invalidating an arbitration clause.  Although often categorized
as a case regarding the validity of arbitration agreements, it and other cases that
invalidated state statutes requiring judicial forum for certain claims42 in effect
hold that states can no longer designate certain categories of claims as non-
arbitrable.
Over a decade later, in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,43 the
Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a Montana statute that voided
arbitration clauses in franchise agreements unless they were identified with a
certain font style and placement.  In Casarotto (which critics might be amused
to know translates in Italian to mean “broken house”), the Court held that the
FAA preempted state legislation that requires greater information or choice in
the making of arbitration agreements than is required in other types of con-
tracts.44  The effect of broad federal preemption is that state courts and legisla-
tures, the traditional loci of consumer protection, have much less leeway either
to prevent enforcement of arbitration clauses that are regarded as eviscerating
actual consent, or to designate matters as not arbitrable.45
The consequence of this jurisprudence, which will be relevant to the dis-
cussion of contrasting features of international arbitration in Part II, is that the
37 See infra Part II.B.2.
38 John P. Tomaszewski, The Enforceability of Adhesive Arbitration Clauses in Interna-
tional Software Licenses, 3 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 4, 4 (1997).
39 Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb?  Comparing the U.S. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 831, 841 (2002).
40 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
41 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1452-55
(1991).
42 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that FAA preempted California
Labor Code provision that required judicial forum for wage claims despite existence of arbi-
tration agreement).
43 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
44 Id. at 686-88.
45 Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 393-94
(2004).
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law regarding the arbitrability and validity of an arbitration agreement is rela-
tively uniform within the United States, but it is at odds with the law of most
other foreign jurisdictions.  As will be discussed later in Part II, states are per-
mitted under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards (the “New York Convention” or the “Convention”) to retain certain
local protections for groups such as consumers and employees, and many states
exercise that prerogative.46
2. Excess and Abuse
As a result of the pro-arbitration jurisprudence described above, repeat
players have been able to implement strategic arbitration clauses that critics
contend undermine one-shot players’ substantive and procedural rights.  In
response to the Supreme Court’s permissive approach to consent, sellers have
compelled arbitration by including clauses in small-print notices, envelope
stuffers, or warranties contained in boxes or sent to consumers in the mail, or
on websites, and in some instances in emails sent separate from the purchase.47
Meanwhile, employers, banks, medical providers, credit card companies, land-
lords, and other service providers often include such provisions in take-it-or-
leave-it agreements that, in other contexts, would constitute contracts of adhe-
sion.48  Empirical evidence suggests that most consumers, tenants, and employ-
ees do not read these provisions and that in many cases, even if they did
observe them, they did not understand their meaning.49
Having shifted potential disputes out of U.S. courthouses, repeat players
have, according to critics, also engineered significant advantages for them-
selves in the arbitration process itself.  One of the most infamous cases reads
like a morality play, written expressly to sermonize against corporate excesses
and the outlandishly one-sided arbitration clauses they might produce.  In the
case, Hooters restaurant and bar chain, perhaps not surprisingly, was sued for
sexual harassment by one of its female employees and sought to compel arbi-
tration of the claim.50  The arbitration rules that Hooters had designed for its
employees required that aggrieved employees provide at the initiation of an
arbitration a detailed notice of any claim, accompanied by a list of all fact
witnesses with descriptions of their testimonies.  The company, meanwhile,
was not required to file any responsive pleadings or to provide any notice of its
defenses or descriptions of its evidence.  Most remarkably, the arbitrators had
to be selected from a list compiled exclusively by Hooters, which had no obli-
gation to include arbitrators who were even nominally independent or impar-
tial.51  Recognized as a caricature of an arbitration clause, the Hooter’s clause
46 See infra Part II.B.
47 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 834.
48 Van Wezel Stone, supra note 1, at 956.
49 Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 8 NEV. L.J. 37
(2007).
50 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).  For readers who are
unfamiliar with Hooters restaurant chain, it acknowledges on its website that the uniforms of
its waitresses, who are referred to as “Hooters Girls,” are specifically designed to bring an
“element of female sex appeal” to the workplace.  Hooters, http://www.hooters.com/com-
pany/about_hooters/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
51 Hooters of Am., 173 F.3d at 938-39.
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was ultimately found to be unenforceable.52  Many other clauses, however,
have been found to be enforceable, even though they raise similar (though less
acute) concerns about how well have-nots might fare under arbitral procedures.
For example, clauses have included provisions that limit discovery, impose sig-
nificant costs, have proceedings in remote locations, shorten statutes of limita-
tions, prohibit the use of class actions, or preclude statutorily available
remedies.53
Apart from any strategic disadvantages that are drafted into an arbitration
clause, one-shot players are arguably disadvantaged by other features inherent
in the nature and practice of arbitration generally.  Critics argue that the
absence of a jury, of reasoned awards, of pre-established procedural rules, and
of appellate review generally inure to the benefit of the repeat players.54  Most
problematically, they argue, the structure of the market for arbitrator services
creates incentives for arbitrators to favor repeat players, who are more likely to
reappoint them in the future.55  These hypotheses appear to find some support
in the outcomes of empirical studies comparing various cases in which employ-
ees are or are not repeat players, and employers are or are not repeat players.56
52 Id. at 935; see, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997)
(another example of an extreme case that was struck down by the California Supreme
Court).
53 Sternlight, supra note 10, at 680-86.
54 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 39.
55 See Guzman, supra note 11, at 1316-24; Marcela Noemi Siderman, Comment, Compul-
sory Arbitration Agreements Worth Saving:  Reforming Arbitration to Accommodate Title
VII Protections, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1885, 1911-18 (2000).  Court challenges based on similar
allegations have so far not met with success. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 35-36
(“Lawsuits already have (thus far unsuccessfully) challenged the bias of presumed repeat
players who are thought to represent the repeat player interest of securities brokers or the
securities industry or who are too homogeneous demographically and not sufficiently repre-
sentative of the claimants.”).
56 In labor cases, where employees represented by unions are repeat players, employees
prevailed in 52% of all cases.  Bingham, supra note 9, at 212-13.  In employment cases,
employees prevailed in 63% of cases overall, but the win rate was only 16% for cases in
which employees were up against repeat player employers. See id. at 210.  Rates of recov-
ery tell a similarly dramatic story.  In arbitrations between employees and non-repeat player
employers, employees recovered an average of 48% of their demand, while in arbitration
against repeat player employers, employees recovered only 11% of what they demanded.
See id.  For additional empirical research and discussion of results, see Lisa B. Bingham,
Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration:  A Look at Actual Cases, 47
LAB. L.J. 108, 113-16 (1996); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts,
and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 238 (1998); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 44-45; Stephen J.
Ware, The Effects of Gilmer:  Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment
Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735 (2001).  Another study of a single employer
compared arbitration results to results obtained by the EEOC in litigation and found that “the
average award per [arbitration] complaint is $576, less than one-third of the EEOC’s
$1,996.54 per-claim average.”  David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment
Arbitration:  A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589 (2005)
(noting that results may reflect that EEOC’s caseload has been screened to select out only
viable claims).  Notably, empirical data also suggests that most employment claims are
resolved without a full adjudication on the merits.  This fact may raise questions about the
reliability of statistics based on adjudicatory outcomes. See id. at 1582.  Moreover, the fact
that a “vast number” of EEOC cases are either dismissed or resolved outside of adjudication
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3. Retrenchment
The disadvantages and, in some cases, outright abuses that arbitration is
perceived to impose on one-shot players have prompted critique and reaction
from virtually all quarters, including the judiciary, the academy, the media,
legislative bodies, and arbitral institutions themselves.57  Scholarly critics have
christened the term “mandatory” arbitration,58 arguing that there is no genuine
consent when the arbitration clause is part of a small-print contract of adhe-
sion.59  With the dubious nature of consent as their starting point, “mandatory”
arbitration’s critics have attacked everything from its constitutionality,60 to its
coherence under basic precepts of contract law,61 to its fundamental fairness,62
to its policy implications.63  They argue that it permits repeat players to evade
mandatory statutory law,64 deprives claimants of procedural justice,65 retards
legal developments,66 undermines democratic lawmaking,67 and ultimately
imposes substantively biased outcomes on less sophisticated parties through
“undermines the argument that arbitration will negatively affect the development of the law
and public accountability.” Id. at 1586.
57 See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve Employment
Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2001); Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims:  Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in
Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1998).
58 The term “mandatory arbitration” remains subject to some debate in the domestic arbitra-
tion community.  I limit my use of the term here also to avoid confusing it with discussions
of “mandatory law,” which refers to legal rules that cannot be contracted around. See
McConnaughay, supra note 16, at 474-75.
59 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 831 n.1; see also Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing
and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Con-
tracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2002) (Arbitration clauses that
must be accepted as a condition of employment are “known in the industry as a pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration agreement (‘PMAA’).”).
60 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity:  A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1009-11 (2000); Jean R. Ster-
nlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbi-
tration:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight, Rethinking]; Jean R. Sternlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001).
61 See Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for
the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 33 (2003) (“State courts should recognize, though
many have not, that those arbitration clauses that eliminate a pre-existing constitutional right
to jury trial should be treated like civil jury trial waivers interpreted outside the arbitration
context.  Thus, to the extent that the state enforces civil jury trial waivers only if they are
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, that same standard should be applied to arbitration
clauses.”).
62 See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 401.
63 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights:  The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1996).
64 Ware, supra note 15.
65 Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 60.
66 See Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration:  The Destruction of the Common Law,
2 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2003); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims:
An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 243 (2000); Sternlight, supra note 10, at
694-96.
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contracts of adhesion.68  There are some scholars who defend the arbitration
regime, including the contracts of adhesion that facilitate it, on the grounds of
economic efficiency.69  The popular press, however, has sided with the critics.
As Jean Sternlight observes, “[M]any major newspapers and news magazines
have written at least one significant piece exposing how companies are elimi-
nating an individual’s right to sue.”70  Just recently the New York Times
recounted another story of arbitration gone awry because of an undisclosed
arbitrator conflict of interest and the lack of regulation that permits and per-
petuates such problems.71
These critiques have not been lost on legislative bodies and the arbitral
institutions themselves.  While the Supreme Court held that the FAA pre-
empted all conflicting state law, in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,72 it did leave states some role to
play in promulgating state law that favors arbitration.73  Meanwhile Casarotto
prevents states from invalidating arbitration agreements, but states continue to
“adopt[ ] laws that modify the parties’ arbitration agreement . . . , regulating the
arbitration process rather than the parties’ obligation to arbitrate.”74  Starting
from these bases, several states have passed legislation to regulate the arbitra-
tion process.75
67 One judicial commentator even went so far as to refer to arbitration as an “overwhelm-
ing” and “putrid odor” on the “body politic.”  Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re
Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999), quoted in Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632 (2005).
68 See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Con-
tracts:  A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory
Arbitration:  Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKE-
LEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996); Reilly, supra note 59.
69 See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 66; David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two:  Why Post-
Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with
Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22-31
(2003); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes:
Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 100 (1999); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process:
Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 89; The-
odore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation:  An Empirical
Comparison (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 65, 2003).
70 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 837, 860 (citing articles in the New York Times, the Wash-
ington Post, U.S. News and World Report, and the San Francisco Chronicle).
71 Gretchen Morgenson, When Arbitrators Are Their Own Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2007, at B1.
72 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
73 See id. at 478-79.
74 Drahozal, supra note 45, at 393-94.
75 After Casarotto, there are questions regarding the continued vitality of some state statutes
that purport to impose limitations on the validity and enforceability of arbitration clauses.
See Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the
Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 472
(1998); Robert Hollis et al., Is State Law Looking for Trouble?:  The Federal Arbitration Act
Flexes its Preemptive Muscle, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 463, 475-76; David Ling, Preserving
Fairness in Arbitration Agreements:  States’ Options After Casarotto, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 193, 193-94 (1997).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ115.txt unknown Seq: 14 24-JAN-08 14:40
354 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:341
Among the most important of these state efforts is a California law that
was adopted after a local paper ran “a series of articles featuring horror stories
about the inequities of arbitration.”76  The new rules substantially expand arbi-
trator disclosure requirements, provide mechanisms for regulating arbitrators,
and, more controversially, potentially increase the bases for disqualifying arbi-
trators.77  California has also enacted statutes regulating the conduct of institu-
tions that administer consumer arbitrations.  In a similar vein, New Mexico has
adopted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (“RUAA”), which permits bor-
rowers, tenants, consumers, and employees in arbitration to void an arbitration
clause that provides for a less convenient forum, reduces access to discovery,
limits right to appeal, precludes class actions, and the like.78
At the federal level, at least two commissions have been established to
evaluate pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the employment sector and both con-
cluded with recommendations that the practice be abolished.79  As a result of
these commissions and critiques from other sources, Congress has also been
under pressure to respond.  Over the years, several bills have been proposed to
provide protections for consumers, but they have all languished and failed.80
As of the time of this writing, some new legislative proposals that would dra-
matically alter the arbitration regime are pending before a Democratic Congress
and, some speculate, may have a better chance of success.81  Cumulatively, if
passed, these proposals would radically rework the domestic arbitration frame-
76 Ruth V. Glick, California Arbitration Reform:  The Aftermath, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 119,
120 (2003).
77 Ruth V. Glick, Should California’s Ethics Rules Be Adopted Nationwide?:  No!  They Are
Overbroad and Likely To Discourage Use of Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at
13; see also Judicial Council of California Adopts Ethics Standards for Private Arbitrators,
13 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 176 (2002) (arguing that the volume of information that
must be disclosed under California’s new standards “may be too burdensome” and could “be
used too readily” to disqualify arbitrators).
78 See Drahozal, supra note 45, at 395.
79 The Secretaries of Labor and Commerce established the Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations (known as the “Dunlop Commission”), which concluded that
mandatory arbitration agreements should not be enforced.  The Secretary of Labor also
appointed a Task Force on Excellence in State and Local Government through Labor-Man-
agement Cooperation, which recommended that all employee arbitration agreements be vol-
untary and entered into after the initiation of a dispute.  For a description of these efforts, see
Reilly, supra note 59, at 1220; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 44-46.
80 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 840.
81 See Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th
Cong. (2007).  The latter two bills are companions introduced as the Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, which would render unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements covering
employment, consumer, or franchise disputes as well as disputes arising under statutes
designed to protect civil rights or to regulate transactions where there is unequal bargaining
power.  The act would also make the enforceability of an arbitration agreement a question
for courts instead of arbitrators.  The former bill, introduced as the Fair Arbitration Act of
2007, would require that arbitration clauses be explicitly labeled, state whether arbitration is
mandatory or optional, identify a source of further information regarding the arbitration pro-
gram, and provide notice that parties retain the right to bring disputes of $50,000 or less to
small claims court.  The Act further provides certain procedural guarantees to the arbitration
process, including the right to a neutral arbitrator, counsel or other representation, a fair,
face-to-face hearing, the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, a written
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work by, among other things, invalidating pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
consumer, employment, and franchise agreements, and requiring that arbitra-
tion clauses be specially designated to put signatories on notice.
Aware that negative publicity and public reaction could be bad for arbitra-
tion business, arbitral institutions have voluntarily undertaken an active effort
to correct and prevent some of the excesses described above.  The American
Arbitration Association and other organizations developed the Employment
Due Process Protocol and the Consumer Due Process Protocol, both of which
provide for certain minimal standards of fairness in pre-dispute arbitration.82
The Employment Protocol, for example, requires that arbitrators have the
power to award any remedy that would be available in a court proceeding.83
Under these protocols, arbitral institutions would not administer arbitrations
initiated under clauses that did not comply with the stated requirements.
Finally, courts have played an important role in reining in arbitral
excesses.  The Supreme Court interpreted the FAA as permitting courts to
refuse enforcement of arbitration agreements or awards that are not valid under
ordinary contract law.  Using principles of fraud, duress, and unconscionability,
courts have begun establishing some contractual limitations on arbitration
clauses that are particularly onerous or unfair.  In one example, which bears
some relevance on the issues discussed in Part II, a court struck down a clause
that required a consumer to arbitrate in Paris under the International Chamber
of Commerce (“ICC”) Rules and to deposit $4000 as an advance toward costs
in order to initiate the proceedings in a relatively small dispute.84  The final
link in this chain of retrenchment is a revision by some companies of their
arbitration regimes to make them more fair, usually in response to or in antici-
pation of the external pressures described above.85
This pattern of openness and excess, followed by reactive retrenchment
may seem to be a natural pendulum swing that is inevitable as the various
players seek to identify, maximize, and protect their interests in any dispute
resolution setting.  Some might argue that this process is even necessary to
produce a reasonable balance between the competing interests.  But it is a dis-
tant second best to intentional system design,86 which can help avoid the costs
that are generated when rival factions engage in all-out competition.  Perhaps
the greatest cost has been perceptions of fairness of arbitration, both among the
public and individual parties.  Perceived fairness is as essential as actual fair-
ness in establishing the legitimacy of a particular dispute resolution process.87
explanation of the arbitrator’s decision, and the right to opt out of arbitration for small
claims.
82 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 842.
83 Id.
84 See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (App. Div. 1998).
85 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 46-47, 50-51 (describing changes at Brown &
Root and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan).
86 See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems
Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 178 (2007) (describing “Dispute Systems Design” as “the
intentional and systematic creation of an effective, efficient, and fair dispute resolution pro-
cess based upon the unique needs of a particular system”).
87 See Christopher J. Peters, Participation, Representation, and Principled Adjudication, 8
LEGAL THEORY 185 (2002).  For a contrasting view, see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair
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As a result of the pattern described above, instead of being regarded as a dis-
pute resolution “panacea,” domestic arbitration has developed a reputation
among many as a “corporate tool” for repeat players.88
B. The Paradigm in Investment Arbitration
Investment arbitration has its own struggles with perceptions of legiti-
macy.89  These problems are also tied, at least in part, to the experience of
have-nots in the arbitration process and to a corollary of the deregulatory effect
that occurred in domestic arbitration.
In investment arbitration, distinguishing between the haves or repeat play-
ers on the one hand, and the have-nots or one-shot players, on the other hand,
requires a more nuanced analysis.90  Conventionally, in a dispute between a
state and an individual, the state would be considered a repeat player, fully
capable of defending its interests, particularly if matched against an individual
or corporate investor.91  In the historical investment context, this was all the
more true because investors most typically were required to resort to the pre-
sumably biased national courts of the host state to resolve claims against that
state.  The inception of the relatively new phenomenon of investment arbitra-
tion has given a twist to this familiar plot.  Some developing states found them-
selves in a role more closely resembling the conventional one-shot player,
unexpectedly having to defend themselves in an unfamiliar process against
claims for “hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, [based on] claims
[that] involve[d] sensitive issues of national policy.”92
Historically, developing countries had guarded their national interests by
refusing to enforce arbitration agreements involving all future disputes (not
only those including nation-states themselves) on the ground that they were an
infringement of sovereignty.93  In the “sweeping liberalizations” of the 1980s
and 1990s, developing nations began accepting international arbitration for
their citizens and acceding to the New York Convention to ensure enforceabil-
ity of agreements and awards.  By the mid-1990s, many developing nations had
also entered into bi-lateral or multi-lateral investment treaties, which designated
arbitration as the mechanism for foreign investors to bring claims against host
governments regarding their investments.94  In other words, states not only per-
mitted their national laws to be enforced (or not enforced) by arbitrators, but
agreed to submit their own sovereign conduct and lawmaking to evaluation by
Process:  The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L.
REV. 485, 510 (2003).
88 Sternlight, supra note 10, at 637.
89 See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitra-
tion:  NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 383-86 (2003); Susan D. Franck, The
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:  Privatizing Public International Law
Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005).
90 As Marc Galanter explains, the distinction between one-shot players and repeat players is
not so much a dichotomy, but ideal types that represent the ends of a continuum. See
Galanter, supra note 7, at 97-98.
91 See id. at 97 (referring to prosecutors as repeat players).
92 Drahozal, supra note 5, at 247.
93 See BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 5, at 21).
94 Franck, supra note 89, at 1525-27.
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arbitrators.  If domestic arbitration can be said to have a deregulatory effect,
investment arbitration might be described as creating a form of global adminis-
trative review of national decisionmaking.95
In bringing investment claims against states, foreign investors typically
hired one of the major international law firms, which have practice groups that
specialize in investment treaty arbitration96 and that are often headed by attor-
neys who also serve as arbitrators in investment arbitrations.  Many developing
countries did not avail themselves of these firms, either because the cost of
these firms was beyond the budgets of many developing countries, particularly
least-developed countries, or because they decided for political reasons not to
retain them.97  As a result, many developing countries have their own govern-
ment attorneys defend them in investment arbitrations, which led in some cases
to “shocking disparities in the quality of legal representation between investor
claimants and developing nation defendants.”98  For example, in its first invest-
ment arbitration, Argentina’s lead attorney purchased key arbitration treatises
with his own money and, given the lack of legal resources in Argentina’s Solic-
itor General’s office, flew to Washington, D.C. a few days before the hearing to
conduct legal research at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”) and local law school libraries.99  In an even more striking
example, in CDC v. Seychelles, Seychelles was represented by its Attorney
General, who had no experience in investment arbitration claims, no Internet
access that would have permitted legal research on Westlaw or LexisNexis, and
no other resources with which to research investment law.100
Inequalities in legal representation were originally a consequence of mar-
ket dynamics, but they were exacerbated by the general lack of transparency of
the system, which served to entrench the advantages of insiders over newcom-
ers.  Rulings by prior tribunals were known to experienced counsel, who could
cite them and develop case strategies around them.  Unwritten procedural prac-
tices were familiar to, and perhaps even developed by, the experiences of the
investment arbitration specialists in the major law firms.
One of the most troubling disadvantages for developing countries has been
their lack of experience or sophistication in selecting arbitrators.  As leading
95 Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 123, 145 (2006) (arguing that “investment
arbitration has emerged as a species of global administrative law” and reviewing the “scope
and potency of this regime as a means of reviewing and controlling the exercise of public
authority by the state”).  For an interesting analysis of how investment arbitration effectuates
shifts in power, see Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014 (2007).
96 Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field:  Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for
Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 253
(2007).
97 See id. at 254; see also Barry Leon & John Terry, Special Considerations When a State Is
a Party to International Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2006, at 68, 75 (“Sometimes
financial resources may make a state unable to employ counsel who is experienced in inter-
national arbitration,” which can “lead to the retention of counsel without the necessary
expertise in international arbitration.”).
98 Gottwald, supra note 96, at 255.
99 Id. at 263-64.
100 Id. at 261-62.
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arbitrator Rusty Park has explained, “Just as in real estate the three key ele-
ments are ‘location, location, location,’ so in arbitration the applicable trinity is
‘arbitrator, arbitrator, arbitrator.’”101  Despite the importance of this decision,
when developing nations need to select arbitrators, they are often at a loss.
Anna Joubin-Bret of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (“UNCTAD”) reports that representatives from developing nations, who
are often unfamiliar with the field and unable to obtain reliable information
about arbitrator candidates, have been known to resort to relatively random
selection criteria, such as nominating an academic they happened to encounter
at a conference on investment arbitration.102  Other experts in the field confirm
that, without the aid and guidance of one of the leading investment arbitration
law firms, developing countries founder in their efforts to obtain reliable infor-
mation about arbitrator candidates.103
Today, many of these inequities have been ameliorated.  Some developing
countries have built up impressive expertise in dealing with investment arbitra-
tion, most notably Argentina, whose Solicitor General’s office today “look[s]
more like an investor-state arbitration practice [than] you might find at one of
the major international law firms.”104  Other states have retained prestigious
international law firms, often times at deeply discounted rates.  Despite the fact
that these developments would seem to put them squarely within the definition
of “repeat player,” the perception of their disadvantage persists and continues
to resonate.  There are many other complaints about investment arbitration that
are unrelated to the disadvantages that developing countries have encountered,
but the perception of procedural unfairness has continued to fuel these other
complaints, particularly about substantive outcomes and their effects on
national and sovereign interests.105
As in the domestic U.S. arbitration context, these perceived inequities
have produced a palpable retrenchment among scholars, non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”), and states.  There have been direct attacks on both the
substantive outcomes of investment arbitration and the procedures that have
produced them.  Respected NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund have
assailed investor-state arbitration as “‘lacking transparency’” and “‘shockingly
unsuited to the task of balancing private rights against public goods.’”106  Per-
haps also in light of other considerations, Bolivia and Ecuador have withdrawn
101 William W. Park, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803, 813
(2002).
102 Anna Joubin-Bret is a Senior Legal Advisor and Technical Assistance Coordinator for
UNCTAD, which works with developing nations to promote the integration of developing
countries into the world economy.  Ms. Joubin-Bret specifically works on policy and techni-
cal issues.
103 Interview with Toby Landau, Barrister with Essex Court Chambers, in London, Eng.
(July 16, 2007).
104 Gottwald, supra note 96, at 264 (attributing this development to the fact that Argentina
now has “the experience of litigating several ICSID cases under its belt”).
105 It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the treatment of national policy interests
in investment arbitration.  For a thoughtful discussion of these issues, see Alvarez & Park,
supra note 89.
106 Id. at 384 (quoting HOWARD MANN, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS:  A GUIDE
TO NAFTA’S CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER OF INVESTOR RIGHTS 46 (2001)).
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from the ICSID Convention altogether and urged other Latin American states
to follow suit.107
Similar to the domestic context, complaints have also been expressed
through concerns about the bias of arbitrators and institutions.108  Developing
nations have attacked the conduct and alleged bias of arbitrators and institu-
tions,109 both through procedural challenges in individual arbitrations and more
systemically.  Meanwhile, one environmental advocate has lobbed the provoca-
tive allegation that a leading arbitral institution, far from being a neutral admin-
istrator, is an active proponent of investment deregulation and that its interest in
deregulation “provides incentives for individual panels to rule in favor of inves-
tors.”110  At a more concrete level, there is now a campaign to prohibit those
who sit as arbitrators in investment arbitrations from also serving as counsel in
other investment arbitrations on the ground that they may, as arbitrators, engi-
neer awards that will be useful for them to cite later as counsel in other
cases.111
There have also been efforts at systemic reform.  Pressed by national leg-
islatures and non-governmental institutions, arbitral institutions themselves
have been working to make the system more transparent and predictable by
ensuring public access and participation as amicus curiae in investment arbitra-
tion proceedings.112  Seminars and other programs have been sponsored by
UNCTAD to guide developing countries in managing investment disputes.113
One interesting proposal suggests formalizing these efforts through creation of
107 Latin America Ponders Pullout of ICSID, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 2007, at 12.
108 See Joel C. Beauvais, Student Article, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA:
Emerging Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 262-63 (2002);
Rene´e Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize:  The U.S. Civil Justice System
in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229, 282.
109 See, e.g., Hague District Court Dismisses Ghana’s Challenge of Arbitrator, MEALEY’S
INT’L ARB. REP., Jan. 2005, at 7; Luke Eric Peterson, Dutch Court Finds Arbitrator in Con-
flict Due to Role of Counsel to Another Investor, INVEST-SD:  INV. L. & POL’Y WEEKLY
NEWS BULL., Dec. 17, 2004, available at www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_investsd_dec
17_2004.pdf.
110 Mark Vallianatos, De-Fanging the MAI, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 713, 727 (1998) (mak-
ing this allegation with respect to the ICC).  This provocative thesis may raise legitimate
questions about the relationship between the ICC’s political branch and arbitration adminis-
tering branch, or at least signal the need for the ICC to make clear the separation.  Propo-
nents of this theory do not, however, clarify how the alleged bias of the institution “provides
incentives” for specific panels in individual cases. Id.
111 HOWARD MANN ET AL., COMMENTS ON ICSID DISCUSSION PAPER, “POSSIBLE IMPROVE-
MENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID ARBITRATION” 11 (2004), available at www.iisd.org/
pdf/2004/investment_icsid_response.pdf (“[P]racticing lawyers who either themselves act as
counsel in cases or have partners who do by definition have a conflict of interest (actual or
perceived) that is inimical to their participation as arbitrators.”); Judith Levine, Dealing with
Arbitrator “Issue Conflicts” in International Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2006, at
60, 62 (“[A]rbitrator’s prior statements about an issue in dispute (an ‘issue conflict’), has
been the subject of scant guidance and has become the subject of growing controversy over
the last few years.” (footnote omitted)).
112 See Chris Ford, What Are ‘Friends’ For?  In NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, Accepting
Amici Would Help Lift the Curtain of Secrecy Surrounding Investor-State Arbitrations, 11
SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 207 (2005).
113 Gottwald, supra note 96, at 270.
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a legal assistance center for developing nations.114  These efforts have been
accompanied by proposals by other groups to rewrite the substantive provisions
of underlying investment treaties and to reorder arbitration procedures to
accommodate regulatory goals that are necessary to ensure sustainable
development.115
Analogous to what happened when judicial decisions opened up new fron-
tiers in domestic arbitration, the newness and unknown quality of investment
arbitration led to perceived excesses and abuses, and ultimately a crisis of legit-
imacy.  One cost of these problems may be that today, in addition to legitimate
concerns about the system, unfounded complaints may be given more credibil-
ity than they otherwise deserve.  Another potential cost, although difficult to
measure, may be the reluctance of states to enter into new investment treaties
that provide for arbitration or to subscribe to the ICSID Convention.116  Like
domestic arbitration, investment arbitration is still struggling not only to func-
tion better as a practical matter, but to restore its tarnished image and reassure
its constituents that it is capable of striking an appropriate balance with respect
to sovereign interests.
II. THE HAVE-NOTS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
While domestic U.S. arbitration and investment arbitration have had their
legitimacy questioned as a result of their treatment of have-nots, international
arbitration is not necessarily destined to follow the same path.  Several features
that are peculiar to the international context have imposed structural limits on
the potential for abuse by repeat players, while other features of the system
suggest that it may hold unique benefits that favor one-shot players.  In the first
Section, I profile the arrival of have-nots in international arbitration.  In Sec-
tions B and C, I analyze how and why the experience of consumers and
employees in international arbitration has not, for the most part, tracked the
pattern of the U.S. domestic arbitration experience.  Divergent national laws
and related issues regarding enforcement of awards under the New York Con-
vention have slowed the entrance of the have-nots, enabled them greater flexi-
bility, made it more difficult for repeat players to indiscriminately impose their
own preferences, and created opportunities for recourse against potential abuses
by repeat players.  Meanwhile, international arbitration resolves many of the
practical problems that make it difficult or impossible for these groups to vindi-
cate claims in national courts.  Far from having the deregulatory effect that
many argue has resulted from arbitration of publicly imbued claims in the
United States, entrusting claims to international arbitration may promote oppor-
tunities for effective transnational regulation.
114 See id. at 270-71.
115 BRITISH INST. OF INT’L AND COMPARATIVE LAW, INVESTMENT TREATY FORUM,
RESPONSE TO WORKING PAPER OF 12 MAY 2005 ON SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE ICSID
RULES AND REGULATIONS (2005); MANN ET AL., supra note 111, at 11.
116 Allegations of systematic bias by arbitrators and the system have led some to argue that
it remains “a huge task” to convince developing nations that they can expect a fair hearing
before international arbitration tribunals.  John Beechey, International Commercial Arbitra-
tion:  A Process Under Review and Change, DISP. RESOL. J. Aug.-Oct. 2000, at 32, 33.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ115.txt unknown Seq: 21 24-JAN-08 14:40
Fall 2007] “HAVE-NOTS” IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 361
A. The Have-Nots’ Arrival
The arrival of have-nots in international arbitration occurred later and for
different reasons than it did in the domestic U.S. experience.  In the United
States, the have-nots’ arrival was precipitated by legal developments that
opened up U.S. arbitration law.117  In the international context, by contrast,
their arrival has been tied to economic and political realities brought on by
globalization.  Even if not yet highly visible, their presence is not negligible,118
and promises to increase in the future.  This section provides a brief overview
of those developments, and previews some of the optimism that has been
expressed regarding their prospects.
1. Employees
One by-product when business went global was the creation of the “dena-
tionationalized employee,” whose employment contract and even daily work is
separated from a particular, or even any particular, situs.119  The original and
most denationalized employees are seamen,120 but today many other employ-
ment relationships involve transnational relationships as employees more and
more frequently move across national boundaries in pursuit of work.  As
described above, in U.S. domestic employment arbitration, there are concerns
about how faithfully U.S. employment laws may be enforced.  In the interna-
tional context, however, effective unilateral application of such laws is more
dubious.  In cross-border employment settings, the state where employment
occurs and the state or states where the employee and employer originate may
each have different and conflicting policies that would apply to the employ-
ment relationship.  Given the impediments to enforcing these policies transna-
tionally through litigation in national courts, arguably arbitration may provide a
more viable mechanism for safeguarding national interests represented in
employment laws, and for finding a meaningful accommodation of conflicting
national laws.  For these reasons, some scholars predict increasing use of arbi-
tration clauses in transnational employment contracts.121
2. Consumers
Similar to the employment context, with the lowering of trade barriers and
the advent of the Internet, consumers are increasingly purchasing across
national borders.122  “American consumers can purchase books not only on
117 See supra Part I.A.
118 For example, the ICC reports that nearly 3% of its cases are for claims valued at under
$50,000. See 2006 Statistical Report, 18 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 5, 14 (2007).  While
this statistic does not necessarily imply the presence of parties who are have-nots, it does
suggest a case with a very different profile than usually supposed in international cases,
which are usually valued in the millions of dollars.
119 James B. Boskey, The Resolution of Disputes in Transnational Employment:  Arbitra-
tion and Its Discontents, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 189, 190 n.8 (1999).
120 For further discussion of seamen’s claims, see infra Part III.C.2.
121 Boskey, supra note 119, at 195-96.
122 Donna M. Bates, Note, A Consumer’s Dream or Pandora’s Box:  Is Arbitration a Viable
Option for Cross-Border Consumer Disputes?, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 823, 823 (2004)
(“Consumer transactions drive many national economies, and with the advent of the Internet
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Amazon.com, but also on Amazon.co.uk, Amazon.de, Amazon.fr, Ama-
zon.co.jp, Amazon.ca, and other transnational merchandisers, while Amazon.
com will ship goods to customers worldwide.”123  These cross-border con-
sumer transactions are occurring at staggering rates, particularly over the
Internet,124 with no signs of stopping.  When disputes inevitably arise, interna-
tional arbitration, particularly online dispute resolution, is often touted as the
only viable means for consumers to pursue claims.  This enthusiasm for inter-
national arbitration is expressed not only by repeat players, who might be
expected based on the experience of U.S. arbitration to be the primary benefi-
ciaries.  Instead, legal commentators and consumer groups have also urged the
use of arbitration for these cross-border disputes.125  Perhaps even more sur-
prising, the European Union, which as described below has a pronounced pro-
consumer legislative agenda that precludes pre-dispute arbitration clauses, has
developed policies to promote the use of online arbitration by consumers.126
Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (the
“OECD”) has sponsored research and devoted symposia to the topic.127
3. Human Rights Victims
Finally, and in some ways most surprisingly, human rights advocates are
arguing that international arbitration may provide not only a possible venue, but
and e-commerce, consumer shopping has taken on a cross-border flavor.  The growth in
transactional traffic increases the need for effective dispute resolution mechanisms.”).
123 Drahozal, supra note 5, at 250.
124 The U.S. Commerce Department estimates that electronic commerce transactions in
2005 totaled $2.4 trillion. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS (2007), available at http://
www.census.gov/eos/www/2005/2005reportfinal.pdf.  Meanwhile, “[p]rojections for future
growth range from 17% to 19% per year through 2008 for business-to-consumer (B2C) e-
commerce to 45% per year through 2006 for business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce.  Much
electronic commerce is domestic—i.e., within a single country.  But increasingly Internet
transactions cross national boundaries.”  Drahozal, supra note 5, at 250; see also Mohamed
Wahab, Globalisation and ODR:  Dynamics of Change in E-Commerce Dispute Settlement,
12 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 123, 127 (2004) (citing estimates “that 63% of the online
population will be purchasing goods and services over the Internet by 2006 [and] . . . that the
total value of e-commerce transactions around the world should reach US $1 trillion in 2003,
and over US $ 6 trillion in 2005”).
125 See Karen Stewart & Joseph Matthews, Online Arbitration of Cross-Border, Business to
Consumer Disputes, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2002) (“As the difficulty inherent in
applying domestic laws to electronic commerce has become more apparent, many consumer
groups have changed sides on the issue and are now in favor of establishing fair procedural
standards for international arbitration.” (citing BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE
COMM’N, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE:  LOOKING
AHEAD (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/lookingahead/electronicmkpl.
pdf)).
126 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW (2002), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0196en01.pdf.
127 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Building Trust in the
Online Environment:  Business-to-Consumer Dispute Resolution – Conference Agenda,
http://www.oecd.org/document/52/0,3343,en_21571361_34590630_1865204_1_1_1_1,00.
html (last visited Nov. 22, 2007).
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a mechanism for enforcing human rights.128  In the most thoughtful work in
this area, Roger Alford argues that international arbitration can impose liability
on sovereigns that has so far proven impossible in international human rights
litigation because of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.129  Companies that
are subject to liability for aiding and abetting rogue governments can pursue
indemnity through international arbitration when allowed by their contracts or a
governing bi-lateral investment treaty.  Meanwhile, Alford and others have
pointed out that the combination of contract and arbitration can empower
socially responsible corporations to enforce human rights norms against their
distributors, suppliers, and other contractors.130  In the most progressive and
innovative of his proposals, Alford suggests that such corporations can even
draft arbitration clauses to permit third parties—such as the human rights vic-
tims themselves or organizations that represent them—to pursue arbitration
claims directly against malfeasors.131
While arbitration and human rights seem like strange bedfellows, arbitra-
tion actually has a long history of facilitating individual claims against govern-
ments that are not suitable for national courts and lack any other viable forum.
That is the reason why claims tribunals, which are a species of international
arbitration, have been historically successful in processing claims by
individuals.132
B. National Regulatory Interests and the Structure of the International
Arbitration System
The New York Convention permits states significant opportunities to pro-
tect their national interests by designating categories of claims as non-arbitra-
ble, as violative of public policy, or as non-commercial, and therefore not
subject to the Convention.  Similarly, the Convention requires that an arbitra-
tion clause be signed and in writing, or evidenced in an exchange of correspon-
dence, but it leaves to contracting states latitude in determining when those and
other formation requirements are met.  Consistent with these provisions and the
flexibility they afford, national approaches to arbitrability, formation, and the
definition of “commercial” vary.  The effect of this variation is that, as
described later in Section C, U.S.-style pre-dispute arbitration clauses have not
128 Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 233, 235
(2005); Ian H. Eliasoph, A Missing Link:  International Arbitration and the Ability of Private
Actors to Enforce Human Rights Norms, 10 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83 (2004);
Sheldon Leader, Human Rights, Risks, and New Strategies for Global Investment, 9 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 657, 684-89 (2006).
129 Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 4-6, on file with author).
130 See id. (manuscript at 2).
131 See id. (manuscript at 35-41).
132 For example, a claims tribunal was established to deal with claims by Holocaust survi-
vors against Swiss banks. See Holocaust Victims Claim Resolution Tribunal Official Infor-
mation Website, http://www.crt-ii.org/index_en.phtm (last visited Nov. 22, 2007).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ115.txt unknown Seq: 24 24-JAN-08 14:40
364 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:341
gone global and, instead, there exist the preconditions that permit regulatory
arbitrage to promote the interests of have-nots.133
1. Arbitrability, the “Commercial” Exception, and Public Policy
Like the FAA, the New York Convention has a pro-arbitration bias that is
designed to promote uniformity and ensure the enforceability of arbitration
agreements and awards.134  Because it is an international agreement, however,
the New York Convention cedes to contracting states more flexibility than the
Supreme Court has deemed necessary to allow the individual states under a
federal statute.  There are essentially three ways a state can insulate claims or
awards from the purview of the New York Convention.
First, Article I(3) of the Convention provides for a “commercial” reserva-
tion, which allows signatories to refuse to enforce agreements or awards that
are not considered “commercial.”  To be effective, the reservation must be spe-
cifically invoked by a signatory at the time they sign the Convention, and to
date fifty-one states have done so.135  While the term “commercial” is generally
interpreted to be very broad, many signatories do not treat consumer claims136
or employment claims as being within its meaning.  In fact, some commenta-
tors argue that “[t]he commercial reservation represents the general interna-
tional antipathy towards consumer arbitration.”137
Second, Articles II(1) and V(2)(a) of the New York Convention permit
contracting states to designate claims as non-arbitrable, which many states
(other than the United States) have done with employment and consumer
claims.  A claim that is not arbitrable under a state’s law need not be referred to
arbitration by that state’s courts in the first place, and awards that deal with
non-arbitrable subjects are not required to be recognized or enforced by that
state.138  While the background assumption has been that the Convention
affords states unbounded discretion to designate categories as non-arbitrable (or
to define public policy), leading commentator Gary Born has recently offered a
more thoughtful and nuanced analysis.139  He reasons that the structure and
nature of the New York Convention implies certain restrictions on states’ abil-
ity to designate categories as non-arbitrable, most particularly if such designa-
133
“Regulatory arbitrage” is sometimes used as a synonym for a “race to the bottom,”
presumably because the term originated to describe corporate conduct that exploited regula-
tory gaps to avoid legal obligations.
134 See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364
F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting the “general pro-enforcement bias informing the con-
vention”); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974) (same).
135 See MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE
947 (2001).
136 Id.
137 Stewart & Matthews, supra note 125, at 1136. But see BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript
ch. 2, at 116) (describing a “clear trend . . . towards a liberal and expansive definition of the
term”).
138 See New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, arts. II(1), V(2)(a), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter
New York Convention].
139 BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 5, at 431-32).
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tions are discriminatory or idiosyncratic.140  Under this reasoning, states cannot
designate categories as non-arbitrable for international arbitration if those same
categories are arbitrable in domestic arbitration or if they are peculiarly out-of-
sync with general international consensus.
The existence of an international consensus about categories of arbitrable
claims is not always clear, however, nor is the question of what criteria should
be used to determine when such consensus exists.141  For example, both the
United States and the European Union permit arbitration of antitrust or compe-
tition claims.142  These are the two largest and most active regulators in the
area of antitrust law, and other important jurisdictions have also followed suit,
including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and China.143  Given this degree of
apparent national consensus, which has also been recognized and invoked by
several international arbitration tribunals,144 it is arguably fair to say that inter-
national consensus has emerged that competition or antitrust claims are arbitra-
ble.  The same cannot be said about consumer or employment claims.
In most countries, pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consumers are
unenforceable as a category.145  The EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Con-
140 See id. at 116 (“[P]rovisions of national law that subject international arbitration agree-
ments to requirements not applicable to other contracts or to domestic arbitration agree-
ments, or that are idiosyncratic[,] . . . are superseded by Article II(1) and II(3) of the
Convention.”).
141 See BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 4 n.468) (suggesting that when arbitrability of
a particular subject area becomes systematically recognized by international and national
tribunals and generally acceded to by nation-states, it may develop into a customary interna-
tional law norm of arbitrability, such that designating that topic as non-arbitrable would be
idiosyncratic and thus violate the New York Convention).
142 Thomas E. Carbonneau & Franc¸ois Janson, Cartesian Logic and Frontier Politics:
French and American Concepts of Arbitrability, 2 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 193, 194 (1994)
(arguing that “the dilution of [restrictions limiting] arbitrability in United States law is also
occurring in France and other European civil law jurisdictions”).  The European Court of
Justice indirectly ruled on the arbitrability of EU competition claims in Eco Swiss China
Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV.  Case C-126/89, Eco Swiss China Ltd. v. Benetton
Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. I-3055.  While the ECJ did not expressly affirm the arbitrability of
competition claims, the vast majority of the commentators regard Eco Swiss as inferring that
the court considers them as arbitrable in principle, even if EC competition law implicates
public policy. See, e.g., Luciana Laudisa, Gli arbitri e il diritto comunitario della concor-
renza, 2000 RIVISTA DELL’ARBITRATO 592 (“The decision of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities implicitly states that the EC antitrust claims are arbitrable.”)
(author’s translation); Richard C. Levin & Gregory P. Laird, International Arbitration of
Antitrust Claims, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 2003, at 10; P.J. Slot, The Enforce-
ment of EC Competition Law in Arbitral Proceeding, 23 LEGAL ISSUE EUR. INTEGRATION
101, 102 (1996).
143 See BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 5, at 367-68); see also WANG SHENG CHANG,
RESOLVING DISPUTES IN THE PRC 78 (1996) (“Except for the disputes specified by Article 3
of the Arbitration Law, it is established that any types of commercial disputes, including
trademark disputes, patent disputes, competition disputes, and security disputes, which were
previously considered to be sensitive, are now arbitrable under the Arbitration Law.”
(emphasis added)); see also CHENG DEJUN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:  COMMENTARY, CASES AND MATERIALS 724 (2d ed. 2000).
144 BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 5, at 369) (“[A]rbitral tribunals have uniformly
affirmed their power to entertain and decide competition law disputes.”).
145 Laws that render arbitration agreements with consumers categorically ineffective could
be conceived of either as a matter of arbitrability or as an issue of formation and validity.
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sumer Contracts includes as “unfair,” and hence unenforceable, any contract
term that has the effect of “excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take
legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the
consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provi-
sions.”146  In implementing this Directive, EU member states have adopted leg-
islation that treats as “unfair” clauses that oblige arbitration for claims that are
less than a specified amount (e.g., approximately $10,000).147  These protec-
tions do not necessarily imply that there is no room for arbitration of consumer
claims, even if the pre-conditions for such claims remain uncertain.  As noted
above, the same EU that passed the Directive rendering pre-dispute arbitration
agreements unfair is elsewhere turning to arbitration to resolve international
consumer disputes.148
The final category that affords states some regulatory leeway under the
Convention is with respect to the public policy exception.  Article V(2)(b) of
the New York Convention permits states to refuse enforcement of awards that
violate public policy.149  At first blush, it appears to open an exception broad
enough to swallow the Convention itself, particularly in light of the policy-
based reasons for historic resistance to arbitration.  In practice, however, it has
been interpreted exceedingly narrowly.  It has drawn the most attention as a
potential counterbalance to arbitrability.150  For example, when the U.S.
Supreme Court permitted arbitration of antitrust claims, it hedged its decision
On the one hand, like arbitrability, they treat an entire category of claims (even if that cate-
gory is defined by the identity of one of the parties instead of the subject matter of the claim
itself).  On the other hand, however, the substance of the prohibitions seems to track more
closely formation and validity defenses, such as incapacity or unconscionability.  One added
twist is that when states designate claims as non-arbitrable, it is often an absolute prohibition
on the mechanism, whereas many laws regarding consumer arbitration preclude only arbitra-
tion when it is agreed to pre-dispute.  For the purposes of this discussion, I have treated
categorical prohibitions as a question of arbitrability, and I deal with more limited formation
requirements in consumer contracts below.
146 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, art. 3(3), annex 1(q), 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29.
147 See BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 5, at 411).
148 There may be other signs of softening when consumer cases are international.  A French
appellate court has ruled that the domestic limitations on arbitration of consumer claims do
not apply in the international context.  Meglio v. Socie´te´ V2000, Cass. le civ., May 21, 1997,
1997 Rev. arb. 537, note E. Gaillard.  There is scholarly debate about applicability of this
French court opinion beyond the unusual facts of that case, but some scholars argue that it
indicates a carve out in France (a jurisdiction traditionally protective of consumers) for inter-
national arbitration of consumer claims.  According to other scholars, as a collector of luxury
cars, the “consumer” in the Jaguar case was really more of an investor and it is doubtful
whether a claim by a more modest consumer would have met the same fate. See Thomas
Clay, Arbitrage et modes alternatifs de re`glement des litiges, 44 RECUEIL DALLOZ 3050,
3053 (2005) (Fr.).  Notably, the dollar value of the car probably also excludes it from protec-
tion under the EU Directive.
149 Article V(2)(b) of the Convention provides that awards need not be recognized if doing
so “would be contrary to the public policy” of the state where recognition is sought. See
New York Convention, supra note 138, at art. V(2)(b).
150 Gary Born explains the distinction between the two as follows:  “[T]he public policy
doctrine provides that certain results reached by arbitral awards contradict public policy and
cannot be recognized, while the non-arbitrability doctrine provides that the arbitral process
itself cannot be used to produce a binding decision in particular cases.” See BORN, supra
note 25 (manuscript ch. 5, at 330).  Meanwhile, he explains that the availability of the public
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by announcing the so-called Second Look Doctrine, which postulates that
courts would still be able to protect U.S. regulatory interests through the public
policy exception.151  Meanwhile, when the European Court of Justice impliedly
accepted arbitrability of EU competition law claims,152 it also emphasized that
competition law “may be regarded as a matter of public policy within the
meaning of the New York Convention.”153  States vary in their apparent will-
ingness to scrutinize awards under the public policy exception, but the potential
for more exacting review can affect how arbitral tribunals apply antitrust law
and other mandatory laws.154
This express opportunity to protect national interests in international arbi-
tration contrasts with domestic arbitration.  Under the FAA, there is a judicially
created public policy exception to award enforcement, though it is not univer-
sally recognized155 and is difficult to implement because it applies only to
awards whose outcomes violate express federal public policy (not state public
policy).  These policies are, in turn, difficult to identify since domestic tribunals
routinely issue awards that do not include articulated reasons.  In international
arbitration, reasoned awards are the norm,156 which means that states can more
readily assess whether they violate national public policy.  The established
practice of issuing reasoned awards prefigures the institutional values that char-
acterize the international arbitration community and that have led it to take an
policy exception is what justifies allowing claims that involve public policy to be arbitrable
in the first instance. Id.
151 Specifically, the Court stated, “While the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that
substantive review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require
intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and
actually decided them.”  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 638 (1985).
152 Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.R.C. I-3055.
153 Id. ¶ 39.
154 In the United States, the Second Look Doctrine has proven to be largely an empty threat.
See Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond:  International Commercial
Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17, 52 (2002) (referring
to the “elusive ‘Second Look’” doctrine that “courts have yet to engage in”); Travis New-
port, Tortious Interference with International Contracts, 9 CURRENTS:  INT’L TRADE L.J. 80,
84 (2000) (“As of yet, the Supreme Court’s second look has not materialized.”).  In Europe,
on the other hand, it seems that courts might be somewhat more inclined to ensure that EU
competition law is not being circumvented.  The apparently greater willingness of European
courts to scrutinize arbitration awards implicating public policy may provide an incentive for
arbitrators to favor European law when deciding choice of law questions.  Niccolo` Landi &
Catherine A. Rogers, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims in the United States and Europe, 13-14
CONCORRENZA E MERCATO 455 (2005-06) (postulating that arbitrators may be more inclined
to resolve conflicting laws in favor of European competition law because of concerns about
enforceability).
155 See, e.g., Warbington Constr., Inc. v. Franklin Landmark, L.L.C., 66 S.W.3d 853, 857-
58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting “public policy” standard as ground for award non-
enforcement because it is not specifically provided for in FAA).
156 See Hon. Lord Justice Bingham, Reasons and Reasons for Reasons:  Differences
Between a Court Judgment and an Arbitral Award, 4 ARB. INT’L 141 (1988) (tracing the
history of reasoned awards back to the “strong balance of international opinion in favour of
the giving of reasons by arbitrators” in the European Convention of 1961, which created a
presumption in favor of reasoned awards in the absence of contrary party agreement).
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express interest in developing and upholding national and international public
policy.157
2. Formation, Validity, and Enforceability Under the New York
Convention
In addition to the threshold questions described above, at a more technical
level, the New York Convention establishes the framework for the formation,
validity, and enforceability of international arbitration agreements.  This frame-
work, once again combined with national legal variation, precludes the possi-
bility that certain types of U.S.-style pre-dispute arbitration agreements could
develop on a global scale.
Article II(1) of the Convention requires recognition and enforcement of
“agreement[s] in writing,” which are defined by Article II(2) to include “an
arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”158  Since shrink-wrap agree-
ments do not involve any signature or “exchange,” arbitration clauses contained
in those agreements would not be enforceable under the Convention159 because
the writing requirement has not been met.160  There is room to argue that states
may supplement the Convention’s writing requirement with other forms of
agreements that are recognized under national law.161  Even if that interpreta-
tion were to gain traction, however, under existing national regulation it would
be unlikely to alter the scene very much with regard to employee and consumer
claims.162
The United States is apparently unique among major jurisdictions in find-
ing consent by consumers, employees, patients, and passengers in shrink-wrap,
small-print boilerplate terms, or unread employee handbooks.163  National law,
in most instances, is more onerous than the New York Convention’s form
requirements.  For example, German law requires that arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts be contained in a separate document that is signed by the
consumer,164 and New Zealand law requires both that “the consumer, by sepa-
rate written agreement, certif[y] that, having read and understood the arbitration
157 See infra notes 173-76.
158 New York Convention, supra note 138, at art. II(1)-(2).
159 Depending on the facts of an individual case, this requirement would seem to prevent
applicability of arbitration provisions established in an employee handbook, but not arbitra-
tion clauses included in employment agreements that are signed by employees as a condition
of employment.
160 See Stewart & Matthews, supra note 125, at 1134 (citing U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
Law, Settlement of Commercial Disputes:  Possible Uniform Rules on Certain Issues Con-
cerning Settlement of Commercial Disputes:  Conciliation, Interim Measures of Protection,
Written Form for Arbitration Agreement, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108/Add.1 (Jan. 26,
2000)).
161 See BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 5, at 57-58).
162 As discussed in Part III, there are some proposed changes to the UNCITRAL Model
Law that could alter this situation. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
163 As Jean Sternlight explains, descriptions of U.S. domestic consumer and employment
arbitration often prompt “statements to the effect that ‘we have nothing like that in my
country’ and ‘that could never happen in my country.’”  Sternlight, supra note 39, at 843.
164 BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 5, at 412 & n.1198) (citing Zivilprozeßordnung
[ZPO] § 1031(5) (Ger.)).
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agreement, the consumer agrees to be bound by it” and that the arbitration
agreement disclose the waiver of various protections.165  These examples sug-
gest that the have-nots may have arrived at international arbitration’s doorstep,
but structural features of the system have so far prevented them from being
shoved over the threshold in the same way they were in domestic arbitration in
the United States.
C. The Regulatory and Mediating Function of International Arbitration
In assessing the potential for have-nots in arbitration, the domestic regula-
tory climate and domestic litigation forums are often used as the yardstick
against which their gains and losses are measured.166  While this is a relatively
easy calculus when assessing domestic arbitration, it is more complicated when
assessing international arbitration.  As previewed by the structural features
described above, the transnational regulatory environment differs significantly
from national contexts.  In Scherk and Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court justified
its decisions to permit arbitration of important statutory claims by pointing to
the fact that, in transnational contexts, states are much less able to enforce
“mandatory” laws than they are in a purely domestic context.167  In cases that
touch more than one state, multiple national courts can usually assert jurisdic-
tion to enforce their national laws, though their judgments face significant
obstacles to enforcement abroad.168  As a consequence, as described above, one
nation’s assertion that a particular law is “mandatory” does not necessarily
make it so if another nation adjudicates the case or refuses to enforce a judg-
ment applying that law.169
Perhaps ironically, U.S. mandatory law is difficult to enforce in interna-
tional cases precisely on account of the procedural mechanisms that make the
U.S. justice system so appealing to consumers, employees, and tort and human
rights victims in the first place.  Broad assertions of jurisdiction, aggressive
party-controlled discovery, class actions, punitive damages, and civil juries all
contribute to the foreign hostility that makes it difficult to litigate international
cases or to enforce U.S. judgments abroad.170  Against this backdrop, interna-
165 Id. (manuscript ch. 5, at 413 & n.1200) (citing New Zealand Arbitration Act of 1996
§ 11).
166 See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution:  Systems Design and the
New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 42 (2005) (arguing that “the endowment of
public adjudication in the United States provides the baseline against which the democratic
character of other dispute resolution processes may be measured, arbitration under the FAA
tends to fall short of the mark in many important respects”).
167 As one scholar notes regarding employment law:  “As employment is denationalized . . .
the state’s capacity to regulate employment and, when it chooses to do so, its ability to
enforce those regulations become increasingly tentative.”  Boskey, supra note 119, at 190.
168 See supra note 25.
169 See John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims:  The Need for
Enhanced Accomodations of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 224 (1986).
This argument has also been advanced by some commentators, who point out that expert
arbitrators may be substantively superior to lay juries. See Dora Marta Gruner, Note,
Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration:  The Need for Procedural
and Structural Reform, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 923, 944 (2003).
170 See Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context:  Will the
Proposed Hague Judgments Convention be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 319-20 (2002)
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tional arbitration arguably may have greater potential to enforce mandatory
law, to resolve claims, and to provide remedies for transnational wrongs than
U.S. courts.171
Shifting to the opposite vantage point, the absence of claimant-friendly
U.S.-style procedures in other systems may make arbitration comparatively less
procedurally detrimental to have-nots than it is considered to be in the U.S.
domestic context.  In the absence of class actions, contingency fees, and puni-
tive damages, private enforcement of antitrust, securities fraud, products liabil-
ity, and other types of claims remains relatively low in European courts.172
Similarly, it is difficult to complain that international arbitration would deprive
parties of their right to a jury trial because no other system similarly guarantees
a jury in civil actions.  In the absence of all these features of American judicial
procedure, international arbitration of consumer and employment claims may
have the potential to be a more attractive forum to European consumers and
employees than their own courts.
This potential is housed in a system that has internalized a sense of its own
regulatory function.  International arbitrators do not simply decide individual
cases for a fee.  They were the original architects of the system and are self-
consciously the modern day custodians of it.  The system they have developed
and maintain intentionally straddles the public-private divide.  In it, arbitrators
not only resolve disputes between parties, but produce law-bound decisions that
often intentionally take into account mandatory law and public policy.173  Inter-
estingly enough, international arbitrators have developed theories and criteria
for enforcing mandatory national law that have not been selected by the parties,
but are implicated by the dispute or the underlying contract.174  Unlike domes-
tic arbitration, the international arbitration system has also created public goods
through an informal system of precedent.  Arbitral awards are being published
with increasing frequency,175 and over the years these awards have generated
important procedural rules and substantive commercial rules, both of which
(“[M]uch of the attack on American-style judicial jurisdiction is not really about jurisdiction
at all, but about unhappiness with other aspects of civil litigation in the United States—
juries, discovery, class actions, contingent fees, and often substantive American law, which
is perceived as pro-plaintiff and selected under similar pro-plaintiff choice of law rules in
U.S. courts.”).
171 For an extended discussion about the incentives for and track record of international
arbitrators in applying mandatory law, see Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the Interna-
tional Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957 (2005).
172 For example, the European Commission recently concluded after extensive study of the
private enforcement of EU competition law that “the picture that emerges . . . in the enlarged
EU is one of astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment.” DENIS WAELBROECK, DON-
ALD SLATER & GIL EVEN-SHOSHAN, ASHURST, STUDY ON THE CONDITIONS OF CLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES IN CASE OF INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION RULES 1 (2004), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/studies/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf,
quoted in Johan Ysewyn, Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU:  Trials and
Tribulations, 19 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 14, 20 n.33 (2006).
173 See Rogers, supra note 171.
174 See id.
175 Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1319 (2006).
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have been exported to other international decisional contexts.176  Most notably,
international arbitrators have also developed rules of international public policy
involving such important topics as bribery and corruption, tax evasion, and
money laundering.
These practices signal important distinctions between international and
domestic arbitration.  Domestic arbitration is often said to operate in the
shadows of the law.177  The international arbitration system, on the other hand,
has the potential to shine light into the lawless corners of transnational activi-
ties, which are darkened by regulatory gaps and by ambiguities about jurisdic-
tion, choice of law, and enforceability of judgments.178  To realize this
potential, the international arbitration system must engage in a dialectic process
with the states that support it.  Both through individual tribunal decisions and
through the institutions that administer it, the system must accommodate the
national policies that they have entrusted to it,179 as it has with other areas such
as antitrust claims.  When those national policies are personified in sympathetic
parties such as employees, consumers, and human rights victims, contravention
is bound to attract more attention.
D. Regulatory Variation and Regulatory Arbitrage
National regulatory variations described above in Section B, combined
with institutional features of the international arbitration system in Section C,
have effectively limited the ability of repeat players to implement structural
dispute resolution advantages on a global scale as they have in the U.S. domes-
tic arbitration setting.  In the employment context, while there is no reliable
data regarding multinational firms’ use of dispute resolution clauses in employ-
ment contracts,180 existing evidence suggests that multinational corporations
have not generally (because they cannot) insisted on arbitration agreements
across the board in foreign employment settings.181  Meanwhile, manufacturers
who market products internationally include shrink-wrap arbitration clauses in
products sold in the United States, but modify those clauses for overseas cus-
176 Id. at 1318.
177 See Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration in the Shadow of the Law, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93 (Peter Newman ed.,1998).
178 International arbitration has demonstrated this potential, but I do not intend to overstate
its accomplishments to date, nor do I mean to suggest that it is assured that the system will
live up to this potential absent external pressures from states. See Robert Wai, Transna-
tional Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown:  The Regulatory Function of Private International
Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 267 (2002)
(“[I]nternational commercial arbitration operates very much ‘in the shadow of the law,’ and
national laws continue to impose important limits.”).  The thesis of this Article is that new
participants and new types of disputes will create new pressures to test the extent and limits
of this potential.
179 See id. at 267-68.
180 Paul Teague, New Employment Times and the Changing Dynamics of Conflict Resolu-
tion at Work:  The Case of Ireland, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 57, 81 (2006).
181 T. Turner et al., Multinationals and Human Resource Practices in Ireland:  A Rejection
of the ‘New Conformance Thesis’:  A Reply, 12 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 128, 129-
30 (2001).
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tomers, either by deleting the arbitration provisions altogether or by including a
clause that leaves arbitration as an option to be agreed upon post-dispute.182
The national variations that produce these differences, meaning variations
regarding arbitrability, the definition of “commercial,” and the requirements for
formation and validity of agreements, have made U.S.-style arbitration agree-
ments improbable in the international context.  This regulatory diversity does
not simply mean that companies must adopt geographically specific dispute
resolution clauses to accommodate different national regimes.  It also creates
the preconditions for regulatory arbitrage.  While regulatory arbitrage is often
regarded as a boon to repeat players, in this instance it may favor consumers
and employees, and even undermine, albeit indirectly, the absolutism of pre-
dispute arbitration within the United States.
Consider the following hypothetical.  A Belgian citizen buys a product
while on vacation in the United States.  Like many products packaged for
American consumers, it contains a shrink-wrap pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment that would be enforceable in the United States but is unenforceable under
European law and the New York Convention.  The Belgian consumer returns to
Belgium and a dispute arises.  The Belgium consumer does not want arbitration
on the terms provided for in the manufacturer’s clause and therefore brings a
claim in a Belgian court.183  In the European Union, there is a jurisdictional
norm that makes businesses subject to suit by consumers in their home jurisdic-
tion and by employees in the jurisdiction where they habitually work.  These
rules are enshrined in the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and reiterated in the draft
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters,184 which has never been concluded, and the Hague Conven-
tion on Choice of Court Agreements, which was concluded on June 30, 2005
(collectively, the “Hague Conventions”).185
Even if these conventions are not directly applicable in this hypothetical,
an assertion of jurisdiction against a U.S. manufacturer would ultimately
depend on national law of the individual European states.  The European norm
of home-court advantage for consumers, combined with existing national bases
for exorbitant jurisdiction, make the assertion of such jurisdiction a very real
182 Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European
Union and the United States, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 357, 383 (2002).
183 A similar dynamic may occur in the employment setting.  For example, if a dispute arose
under a contract between a French employee and a U.S. company regarding employment in
France, even if the contract included an arbitration clause, because employment claims are
not arbitrable in France, the employee would be able to seek refuge in French courts, either
by bringing an affirmative claim, or by attempting to have French courts block an arbitration
if it were seated in France.  Moreover, France would not recognize or enforce any award that
was rendered elsewhere.
184 The draft Hague Convention specifically provides that consumers and employees can
only be sued in their home jurisdictions and have the right to sue either in their home juris-
diction or (in the case of employees) in the state where they work. See Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters arts. 7 & 8 (Draft
1999), available at http://launet.com/Hague/Oct99Draft.html.
185 See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 2(1)(a), June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M.1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98.
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prospect.186  As a consequence of the existence of such a judicial forum, the
consumer would have a platform on which to invalidate or avoid the arbitration
clause either under EU law or under the New York Convention.187  Even under
this scenario, however, the dispute may still end up in arbitration.  For the rea-
sons described above, the consumer may want to arbitrate the dispute, particu-
larly given the complexities and expense of litigating it.  In that post-dispute
setting, however, the consumer can probably insist on an alternative arbitration
provision that would be more consumer-friendly and thereby enforceable under
EU law.188
While foreign tourist purchases represent an infinitesimally small part of
the total U.S. market, online purchases and gray market importation of products
packaged for sale in the United States may make the critical features of this
hypothetical more systematic and widespread.189  Globalized markets, and
more specifically the European commitment to consumer protection, may not
only create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by “little guy” consumers and
employees, but also focus attention on comparative models that demonstrate
how post-dispute arbitration agreements can function effectively in these
areas.190
These opportunities for regulatory arbitrage occur against a significantly
different set of procedural opportunities than exist in purely domestic cases.  As
described above,191 national courts are not as readily available or effective at
resolving international disputes.  As a result, international arbitration provides
procedural and structural advantages that may make it not simply a lesser alter-
native to national court litigation, but a superior choice.
186 See Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME. L. REV.
474 (2006); John Fitzpatrick, The Lugano Convention and Western European Integration:  A
Comparative Analysis of Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe and the United States, 8
CONN. J. INT’L L. 695 (1993).
187 As Chris Drahozal explains:
In many if not most cases, the individual presumably will be able to sue in his or her home
country.  But the arbitration clause may well prevent the individual from suing the business or
employer in the United States, and thus from taking advantage of procedural aspects of the
American litigation system such as juries and class actions.
Drahozal, supra note 5, at 255.
188 In Europe, there are well-organized and active groups that represent consumers.  They
provide a number of services, including advice, counseling, and occasionally representation
in disputes, as well as lobbying. See Luisa Antoniolli, Consumer Law as an Instance of the
Law of Diversity, 30 VT. L. REV. 855, 875 n.81 (2006).
189 To date, importation of gray market goods is not generally permitted in the European
Union. See Kimberly Reed, Levi Strauss v. Tesco and E.U. Trademark Exhaustion:  A Pro-
posal for Change, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 139 (2002).
190 For example, some proponents of arbitration in the United States argue based on law-
and-economics analysis that post-dispute arbitration could never be effective in the con-
sumer context.  The Belgian example, where post-dispute arbitration agreements are evi-
dently both popular and effective with consumers, provides a provocative real-world
counter-example, even if there are cultural, economic, and legal differences that might affect
how easily the experience could be transplanted to the United States.  Maud Piers, How EU
Law Affects Arbitration and the Treatment of Consumer Disputes:  The Belgian Example,
DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2004-Jan. 2005, at 76.
191 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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III. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AS A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
The procedural and structural advantages described above combine with
the internal values of the international arbitration system, and the network of
organizations that influence its functioning, to suggest that it has the potential
to be more than simply an effective mechanism for resolving disputes.  Interna-
tional arbitration could be a forum for resolving conflicting national policies
and laws, developing international norms, mediating national differences
among national procedural strategies, and ultimately promoting effective trans-
national governance.  The arrival of have-nots has and will focus attention on
two important features of the system that have been and will be essential for
this potential to be realized.  First, in Section A, I address the inter-relational
role of national authorities with the system and the need for international stan-
dards to replace discordant national rules.  In Section B, I consider how the
market for arbitration services might respond to these new parties.  Finally, in
Section C, I take up international arbitration’s greatest challenges in mediating
conflicting national rules, such as in the context of seamen’s claims, and devel-
oping transnational norms, such as in the human rights context.
A. National Legislation and the New York Convention
Because the regulatory climate in the transnational context differs signifi-
cantly from domestic contexts, states do not have “a normative monopoly on
transnational conduct.”192  As a result, non-state based systems, such as inter-
national arbitration, can be an important context for national policies to be
debated, mediated, and enforced.  On the other hand, national authorities
should not simply abandon their national policies to the system,193 as some
argue the U.S. has with other important regulatory claims, such as antitrust and
securities.194  The continued influence of national protections for consumers
and employees is an important factor in preventing international arbitration
from sliding down the same slope that domestic arbitration did.  At this point,
however, international standards for formation and validity of arbitration
clauses, as well as harmonized procedural standards, should be developed for
transborder consumer and employment contexts.
To date, most proposals for development of transnational substantive con-
tract law have intentionally avoided the areas involving consumers and employ-
ees, in large part because they are laden with widely divergent national policies
that seem to be beyond the potential for harmonization.195  This exclusion of
substantive claims has not been mirrored in efforts to draft transnational private
192 See Wai, supra note 178, at 267.
193 See id. at 267-68.
194 See McConnaughay, supra note 16, at 475.
195 Michael Joachim Bonell, Do We Need a Global Commercial Code?, 106 DICK. L. REV.
87, 91 (2001) (arguing in favor of a global commercial code, but arguing that it should avoid
interfering with domestic consumer protection rules).  The European Union presents an
interesting counter-example in that it has special competences regarding consumer contracts
but not for general contract law. See Louis F. Del Duca, Developing Global Transnational
Harmonization Procedures for the Twenty-First Century:  The Accelerating Pace of Com-
mon and Civil Law Convergence, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 625, 653 (2007).
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law instruments.  Under the Hague Conventions, described above,196 forum
selection clauses in contracts involving consumers and employees are permit-
ted, but can only be entered into after a dispute has arisen.197  While neither
Convention has direct application in international arbitration, they illustrate the
existence of international consensus and the possibility of drafting international
carve outs for these types of claims.
In the absence of such carve outs specifically applicable to international
arbitration, individualized carve outs have been imposed by states through
exercise of their prerogatives under the New York Convention.  This approach
has effectively prevented the global spread of U.S.-style pre-dispute arbitration
clauses,198 but the regulatory arbitrage it has afforded is only an intermediate
step, not a permanent solution.  Loading national regulatory interests into con-
cepts of arbitrability and “commercial,” and into nationally defined formation
requirements, arguably undermines the New York Convention’s objective of
promoting uniform enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.199  In
those instances where states have altogether precluded application of the New
York Convention to consumer and employment claims by designating them
non-commercial or non-arbitrable, they have precluded those groups from
invoking, even post-dispute, a mechanism that may be uniquely capable of
effectively vindicating their claims and enforcing national policies.
There is a need for express carve outs in the New York Convention and
the UNCITRAL Model Law200 for the formation of arbitration agreements
involving consumers and employees to replace the protections that are now
embedded in divergent national laws.  In this respect, recent revisions to the
UNCITRAL Model Law are a missed opportunity to include a uniform, global
carve out for consumer and employment claims.  While the 2006 revisions are
said to “substantially liberalize[ ] and modernize[ ]” the formation requirements
of arbitration agreements,201 they fail to recognize the national interests that are
implicated in consumer and employer claims, and instead effectively eliminate
the New York Convention’s writing requirement, which has been an impedi-
196 See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
197 See Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters, supra note 184, at arts. 7(3)(a) (consumers) & 8(2)(a) (employees).
198 See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
199 See BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 2, at 124).
200
“UNCITRAL” stands for the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
It has promulgated both Arbitration Rules, which are procedural rules that can be adopted by
parties in their arbitration clauses, and a Model Law, which can be adopted by states to
provide a domestic legal framework to support international arbitration, much like the FAA
does in the United States.
201 See BORN, supra note 25 (manuscript ch. 5, at 69-70).  The revisions were meant to
address some of the New York Convention’s antiquated notions of formation and commer-
cial practices. See id. at 54. (“Many readers may never have seen a “telegram,” while new
forms of electronic communication such as facsimile transmissions, e-mails, SMSs, instant
messaging and the like are routine occurrences in international business,” but are not
included in the New York Convention’s formation requirements.).
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ment to the global spread of American-style consumer and employee
arbitration.202
Apart from internationalizing the formation requirements, there is also
work to be done to ensure procedural or substantive protections for these
groups.  As Rusty Park suggests, “The laissez-faire court scrutiny appropriate
to an international proceeding, between sophisticated business managers with
access to competent counsel, may be quite misplaced in a consumer case,
where an arbitration clause might require an ill-informed individual to seek
uncertain remedies at an inaccessible venue.”203  To date international arbitra-
tion institutions have not formally adopted procedural accommodations or spe-
cialized rules similar to the Employment and Consumer Due Process Protocols
adopted by the AAA.204  Moreover, it remains to be seen whether heightened
review of arbitral awards involving consumer or employment claims by
national courts is the best way to ensure that mandatory laws are being
enforced or at least duly considered.  In sum, the international arbitration sys-
tem does not have in place structures to accommodate these new types of
claims, such that states might reconsider relinquishing the obstacles that they
have created under national law.
B. The Market for Arbitrator Services
In domestic and investment arbitration, concerns about both procedural
fairness and substantive outcomes have sometimes been expressed as, and on
occasion directly stem from, real or perceived misconduct by arbitrators.  This
reaction is not surprising because the arbitrator both personifies the promise of
neutral decisionmaking that is the essence of adjudication205 and provides the
only tangible indicia of decisional legitimacy.  International commercial arbi-
tration has not itself been entirely free from issues regarding arbitrator bias and
conduct.206  The number of challenges to arbitrators has risen sharply in recent
years,207 and there is lively debate about standards for disclosure and challenge.
These issues, however, have largely percolated within the system without creat-
ing an externally perceptible crisis of legitimacy.208  The arrival of the have-
202 If adopted as is, without national amendment, the Model Law would effectively elimi-
nate the form requirements on which national variations are currently based. See UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 7(2)-(3) (amended 2006).
203 William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration:  The Case for FAA
Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1243 (2003). Rusty Park argues for a carve out
to preclude application of the New York Convention to such claims altogether.  The con-
cerns behind this argument, however, might be satisfied by other means.
204 It may well be that when the ICDR is seized with an international consumer or employ-
ment case, it insists on application of the protocols.
205 See Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators:  A Functional Approach
to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 86-87 (2005).
206 For a discussion of ethics and conduct issues raised about international arbitrators, see
id.
207 International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration, Securing a
Regime for Effective International Arbitrations, at 4, Jan. 26, 2005.
208 One important exception to this observation is the concern expressed by and on behalf of
parties from developing countries that international commercial arbitration is biased against
them. See Beechey, supra note 116, at 33; Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri, Is There a Growing
International Arbitration Culture in the Arab-Islamic Juridical Culture?, in INTERNATIONAL
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nots will present specific new challenges regarding arbitrator conduct and the
functioning of the market for arbitrator services.
The starting point for evaluating these challenges is the observation that
one of the most vital patrimonies of the international arbitration system has
been the cadre of arbitrators who decide its disputes.  One notable distinction
between international and domestic U.S. arbitrators is that American-style
highly partisan party-appointed arbitrators are largely rejected as inappropriate
in international arbitration.209  This difference can be attributed, at least par-
tially, to what might be called the professional210 ethos of the international
arbitrators and institutions.  This collective sense of mission focuses the arbitra-
tion community on many topics that might otherwise be considered beyond
their basic dispute resolution function.  In addition to its attentiveness to
national mandatory law described above,211 the community has been collec-
tively moving to make itself more transparent,212 a development that makes the
system more user-friendly for newcomers and smaller parties.  In addition,
international arbitrators are openly concerned about their role in ensuring the
fairness of proceedings, including how to strike an appropriate balance when
the parties are not well matched, which is again a preoccupation that will bode
well for have-nots.
More fundamentally, the international arbitration community is highly
sensitive to perceptions of its own legitimacy.  As described above, it also has
developed a shared sense of the system’s regulatory function, which is manifest
in various ways that make it more reliable and more sturdy under the strain of a
new genre of claims than domestic U.S. arbitration proved to be.213  This com-
munity, in other words, epitomizes what Oscar Schachter referred to as “the
invisible college of international lawyers.”214
DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CULTURE 47, 47-48
(Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed., 1998).  While there are strong similarities, this critique has
been expressed less systematically and less vigorously in the international commercial con-
text than in the investment arbitration context.
209 James H. Carter, Improving Life with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator:  Clearer Conduct
Guidelines for “Nonneutrals,” 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 295, 298-99 (2000); see also
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies:
Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 59, 65 (1995) (noting international norms that seek to
neutralize perceived partisanship in the party-appointed arbitrator); V.V. Veeder, Is There
Any Need for a Code of Ethics for International Commercial Arbitrators?, in LES ARBITRES
INTERNATIONAUX 187 (Jose´ Rosell ed., 2005) (noting that the “national problem of the parti-
san arbitrator is largely missing amongst international arbitration tribunals”).
210 In using the term “professional” or “profession” to describe arbitrators, I am not refer-
ring to those whose exclusive occupation is to sit as an arbitrator.  Instead, I am referring to
the sense of a particularized obligation that arbitrators share and cultivate as a community,
even though the community includes those whose primary occupation is that of barrister,
solicitor, or lawyer.  For his insistence on the importance of this distinction, I am grateful to
Martin Hunter.
211 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
212 For an overview of various developments that have rendered the system more transpar-
ent, see Rogers, supra note 175, at 1319.
213 See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
214 Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV.
217, 225 (1977) (referring to “la conscience juridique” or sense of justice that characterizes
international lawyers).
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On the other hand, two important recent changes have affected the make-
up and mission of this stalwartly group.  In recent years, the number and diver-
sity of international arbitrators have expanded dramatically,215 while at the
same time newer arbitrators are decidedly more entrepreneurial than the “grand
old men” who founded the system.216  As a result of these two trends, interna-
tional arbitrators as a group are less constrained by shared traditions than they
once were.  Moreover, there is a risk that newer arbitrators may not be incul-
cated with the same professional ethos that has traditionally been a source of
their strength.  The entry of have-nots will likely increase the pressure on both
of these trends.
Cases involving have-nots will inevitably involve significantly lower dol-
lar amounts,217 and hence significantly lower arbitrator fees.  Already, arbitra-
tors complain that fees are too low in smaller cases when compensation is set
based on the amount in dispute,218 but there are also concerns that, when fees
are based on hourly or daily rates, arbitrators may be tempted to artificially
extend the matter to earn more fees.219  Meanwhile, there is a competing con-
cern that international arbitration is inherently too expensive for smaller parties,
which as described above has prompted at least one U.S. court to invalidate an
ICC arbitration clause because of the excessive cost.220
The likely response to these competing pressures is the entry of new “dis-
count” international arbitrators.  This development, however, could raise poten-
tial problems.  There is a risk that these new arbitrators might develop into a
215 Rogers, supra note 171.
216 See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:  INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 34-36
(1996).
217 As indicia, some European consumer protection legislation is limited to purchases with a
value of under 10,000 euro. See supra note 148.  Meanwhile, with the exception of discrimi-
nation cases that might garner punitive damages if U.S. law is applied, employment disputes
are unlikely to involve excessive dollar values.
218 See Eric A. Schwartz, The ICC Arbitral Process, Part IV:  The Costs of ICC Arbitration,
4 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 8, 11 (1993) (“The Court regularly receives complaints from
arbitrators that their fees are too low and do not take sufficient account of the number of
hours devoted by them to a case.”); Jacques Werner, Remuneration of Arbitrators by the
International Chamber of Commerce, J. INT’L ARB., Sept. 1988, at 135, 135 (stating that
under the ICC system “in the large number of cases where the [case] is small or medium-
sized, the arbitrators are underpaid”).  These citations come from John Gotanda’s thoughtful
work on arbitrator fees.  John Yukio Gotanda, Setting Arbitrators’ Fees:   An International
Survey, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779, 784 n.10 (2000).
219 Gotanda, supra note 218, at 786 & n.17 (noting that fees calculated on an hourly or daily
basis do “not provide an incentive for efficiency” and describing one commentator’s concern
about the “danger” that an arbitrator can intentionally prolong proceedings to earn higher
fees).  For further discussion of arbitrator compensation trends, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes:  What’s Happening
and What’s Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 950-51, 968-69 (2002).
220 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  This case has also received attention from
scholars who note:
[A]t least one court has held that a previous version of the Gateway clause, which provided for
arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), was
unconscionable and thus unenforceable, because of the high costs of ICC arbitration relative to
the small amount at stake in the proceeding.
Drahozal & Friel, supra note 182, at 381-82.
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secondary sub-class, meaning that they would not be integrated into the
existing international arbitration community.  If regarded as a sub-class of
interlopers instead of full-fledged members of the community, these new arbi-
trators would be trading on the reputation and working with the institutions of
the international arbitration community, but they would not be incorporated
into international arbitrators’ normative community.  They would be less likely,
as a result, to internalize the standard of integrity and the commitment to a
transnational regulatory function that characterizes the traditional model of the
international arbitrator.
Another related concern with the entry of have-nots is that the panoply of
cases will involve claims that are much more divisive than conventional inter-
national arbitration disputes.  As noted above, there have not generally been in
international commercial arbitration allegations of categorical bias similar to
those that have infected domestic and investment arbitration.221  One important
reason why such allegations have not erupted is the professional ethos
described above.  Another reason is that in conventional international commer-
cial disputes, ideological affiliations or divisions are more muted because the
identity of the parties is largely irrelevant to the merits of a contract dispute.
As noted in the Introduction, no one much cares whether Company A or Com-
pany B is found to have breached a particular contract.222  In the absence of
readily identifiable “sides,” arbitrators in commercial disputes are not as easily
regarded as ideologically aligned with or partial to one “side,” as they are
alleged to have been in domestic arbitration and investment arbitration.  Claims
involving consumers and employees will challenge this conventional model.
Consumer and employee claims are more likely to implicate a decision
maker’s ideological persuasion, as they are perceived to do in domestic U.S.
and investment arbitration settings.  If new arbitrators lack a professional ethos,
the more divisive nature of disputes may produce more polarized outcomes
and, if the worst of allegations are to be believed, a strategic favoring of repeat
players.
To avoid these potential problems, international arbitration institutions
such as the ICC, the LCIA, and the ICDR have a leading role to play in build-
ing capacity for the system to handle these new claims.  They are in the best
position to influence whether new arbitrators develop into a peripheral sub-
class of the arbitration community or into an integrated part of it.  One way to
ensure the latter would be to encourage consumer arbitration as a training
ground for junior practitioners.  Most institutions already sponsor training pro-
grams for young lawyers seeking to become arbitrators and use these sessions
not only to impart information and develop specific skills, but also to transmit
221 See supra notes 11, 108-11 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.  This general rule may not hold when the
dispute is between a state and a private party.  Not surprisingly, claims that international
commercial arbitration is biased are often founded in cases involving states.  El-Kosheri,
supra note 208, at 47-48 (noting that, despite the long history and current popularity of
arbitration in Arab nations, the Arab legal community remains hostile toward transnational
arbitration because of biased treatment by Arab state interests by Western arbitrators).
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the system’s commitment to larger goals such as fairness and effectiveness.223
Because no other credential can substitute for actual experience as an arbitrator,
some institutions already have a policy of appointing junior practitioners as
arbitrators in smaller cases.224  Consumer claims make for ideal training cases
because the factual and legal issues are relatively simple (as compared, for
example, to small value construction or intellectual property disputes), and the
relatively small amounts in dispute suggest that even large companies are
unlikely to send senior counsel to handle the matter.
Employment claims present a more difficult proposition.  They tend to be
more complicated both legally and factually, and even cases with small
amounts in dispute may implicate company policies that prompt senior counsel
to handle claims.  For these reasons, they may be a less friendly training ground
for junior arbitrators and may be more prone to development of a separate,
specialized group of arbitrators, as has occurred in the United States.  Even in
this context, international institutions still have an important role to play.  In the
domestic context, the Employment Due Process Protocol described above225
specifically calls for training of arbitrators in the applicable statutes and legal
issues involved in such claims.  Such training would inevitably be more com-
plicated when employment touches multiple jurisdictions, which may have
incompatible mandatory employment laws.  It is precisely this added complex-
ity, however, that would make such training an essential step toward ensuring
the quality of international employment arbitration.
C. International Arbitration, Transnational Regulation, and International
Legal Norms
The international arbitration system has, as described above, demonstrated
a robust respect for national mandatory law and has developed both theories for
its application and for application of substantive international public policy.226
These theories and rules were developed within the arbitration community over
time and through a dialectic process in conjunction with other national and
223 See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, How Does the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Contribute to Capacity Building?  The Way For-
ward, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2005), available at https://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/46/37215823.pdf
(describing the ICC training program for young lawyers and special opportunities for those
from developing countries); The London Court of International Arbitration, Young Interna-
tional Arbitration Group, http://www.lcia.org/YIAG_folder/yiag_main.htm (last visited Nov.
22, 2007) (describing the Young International Arbitrator Group sponsored by the LCIA and
organized to provide a forum in which to “exchange views on, and to debate, topical issues
in international commercial arbitration”); ICCA Young Arbitration Practitioners Program,
http://www.iccamontreal2006.org/english/young/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2007) (covering a
range of topics that affect young arbitrators, including consumer disputes).
224 The other training opportunity is to act as a secretary to the tribunal.  While having the
advantage of giving aspiring arbitrators a chance to observe first hand, it is presumably less
effective at helping them develop their own style and skill in presiding over proceedings.
See Emilia Onyema, The Role of the International Arbitral Tribunal Secretary, 9
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB 99, 109 (2005) (stating that the position of the tribunal
secretary “affords young and aspiring arbitrators the opportunity of being present at an arbi-
tral hearing and actually getting involved in the arbitral reference”).
225 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
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international legal actors.227  This process, as well as its outcomes, illustrates
that international arbitration can be a “venue for the contact and mutual influ-
ence of different systems,” as well as a context “to encourage contestation
among and across other normative orders” and to develop transnational
norms.228  Among the various categories of have-nots, human rights victims
and seamen are the most likely to test the extent and limits of this potential.
1. Developing and Enforcing Transnational Human Rights Norms
The entry of human rights victims in international arbitration complicates
the identity of putative have-nots.  In the scenarios posited by Alford and other
scholars, these cases will involve large multinational corporations and “West-
ern” NGOs, whose resources and long-term strategies put them in the role of
repeat player, against potentially small offending companies (such as local sup-
pliers or distributors) that acted in collaboration with the governments of
(often) developing countries.229  Local distributors or suppliers will not have
either the resources or the sophistication of the multinationals or the NGOs, and
as illustrated above in the context of investment arbitration,230 developing
nations may not be well-equipped to adequately represent their own interests.
Even acknowledging these potential limitations, international arbitration
still holds the promise of being a more effective mechanism than national
courts for holding human rights abusers, including governments, accounta-
ble.231  It not only avoids jurisdictional problems such as foreign sovereign
immunity, but it also obviates comity concerns that arise when the courts of one
nation sit in judgment on the actions of another and the practical problems
involved in enforcing national court judgments.232  International arbitrators
may also have unique insights into the commercial contexts in which such
abuses arise.  This perspective may make them uniquely suited to resolve dis-
putes regarding, and to develop transnational norms to govern, some of the
227 For example, as the rule against enforcement of contracts for payment of a bribe or that
are procured through bribery was developing in international arbitration, outside–the–system
pressures came from invigorated enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the
United States, the development of the OECD Convention, and the lobbying efforts of NGOs
such as Transparency International.  The result is that the international arbitration system
provides an essential, though not perfectly uniform, function in helping thwart the otherwise
intractable regulatory problem of international bribery.
228 Wai, supra note 16, at 483.
229 For example, Ian Eliasoph posits a multinational apparel company including a contrac-
tual obligation to respect fair labor standards in an agreement with its subcontractor and
bringing an arbitration claim if that obligation is violated. See Eliasoph, supra note 128, at
84.  Alford relies on similar hypotheticals but also suggests that corporations may also go
one step further, creating third-party beneficiary rights in contracts so that human rights
advocates could bring arbitration claims directly against the offending entities or states. See
Alford, supra note 129 (manuscript at 24-30).
230 See supra Part I.B.
231 See supra Part II.A.3.
232 As several commentators have noted, judgments in human rights litigation have largely
been symbolic and have not resulted in monetary recovery. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 129
(manuscript at 1) (“For years human rights litigation appeared to be an act of public sham-
ing, somewhat effective as a tool for embarrassment, but of little use to genuinely compen-
sate victims or punish violators.”).
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more delicate questions that remain open to debate in international law.  For
example, international arbitrators may have unique perspectives to contribute in
the development of norms regarding the nature and extent of corporate liability
for aiding and abetting human rights abuses, a subject that has split U.S.
courts.233  Their notable experience developing international public policy
norms against bribery, corruption, and money laundering will provide a useful
foundation in fulfilling this function.
2. Mediating Divergent National Policies Regarding Seamen’s Claims
Seamen are the ultimate denationalized employees, but adjudication of
their claims presents unique issues and special challenges to international arbi-
trators in light of the competing national policies involved.  Historically, U.S.
courts and Congress were committed to a policy that treated foreign seamen as
wards of the American admiralty courts and ensured them a “rightful” day in a
U.S. court, predicated on their and their employers’ physical presence in the
U.S.234  While there has been some wavering on this policy,235 in general U.S.
law is still committed to permitting them to bring claims in U.S. courts when
there is a substantial connection to the United States.  This policy appears to be
reflected in section 1 of the FAA, which excludes “contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce” from the FAA’s coverage.236  This policy, however,
clashes directly with Philippine policy, which mandates that claims arising out
of seamen’s employment contracts be arbitrated as part of an effort to secure
233 Compare In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (concluding that the international sources for aiding and abetting liability do not estab-
lish “a clearly-defined norm”), with Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir.
2002) (applying an international standard for criminal aiding and abetting to determine Uno-
cal’s liability for its role in human rights abuses committed by the Myanmar military), reh’g
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).  One of the most thoughtful works on theories for
corporate responsibility for human rights violations is by Steven Ratner. See Steven R.
Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:  A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J.
443 (2001).
234 The ancient doctrine that the seaman is the ward of the admiralty developed pre-
cisely because seamen were considered to be vulnerable parties requiring judicial
protection.  The doctrine’s modern incarnation should hold that seamen from devel-
oping countries like India, Ukraine, or the Philippines—men and women who are
probably undereducated, desperate, and willing to work aboard ship (where, out of
necessity, their freedoms are greatly constrained) on almost any terms—merit special
solicitude.
Matthew Nickson, Closing U.S. Courts to Foreign Seamen:  The Judicial Excision of the
FAA Seamen’s Arbitration Exemption from the New York Convention Act, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J.
103, 143 (2006).
235 While courts had traditionally sought to protect the “friendless seaman,” more recently
they have shown a greater willingness to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. See Patrick Knight, Tort Reform Going Overboard:  Congress Decides the Issue of
Foreign Seamen in American Courts, 9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 279, 290-92, 300 (1996).  Moreo-
ver, Congress has flirted with the idea of legislation that would have impaired the ability of
foreign seamen to bring claims in U.S. courts. See id. at 292-98.
236 Nickson, supra note 234, at 107.
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overseas jobs for citizens and thereby improve the Philippine economy.237
Recent U.S. decisions have permitted claims by foreign seamen to be sent to
arbitration, reasoning that the FAA’s language excluding seamen from its pur-
view does not apply to international cases governed by the New York Conven-
tion.238  Some commentators have questioned these outcomes in light of the
language of section 1 of the FAA, but they may also be at least partially
explainable as an expression of judicial deference to the competing Philippine
policy.
Whatever the motivation for courts to permit arbitration, shipping compa-
nies may have pressed for arbitration on the assumption that arbitrators will be
less robust in protecting seamen than U.S. courts.  Ultimately, the accuracy of
this assumption will depend a great deal on the individual arbitrators.  Perhaps
not coincidentally, the choice of arbitrators appears to be limited under the
arbitration clauses at issue in these cases.  These clauses require that disputes
be submitted either to the “[Philippine] National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.”239  Anecdotal
reports from U.S. attorneys who specialize in seamen’s claims suggest that
awards from NLRC arbitrators are notoriously low, particularly in contrast to
what they would receive in a U.S. court.  Low compensation for injured seamen
may reflect both economic and legal assumptions underlying Philippine notions
about what constitutes “just” compensation, but also Philippine national policy
that seeks to bolster employment of Philippine nationals by keeping the costs of
employing them low.  As a national organ, the NLRC is presumably charged
with applying these national standards and policies.
Notably, the arbitration clause also seems to contemplate the possibility—
although it is not entirely clear under what conditions—that a “voluntary arbi-
trator or panel of arbitrators” may decide the case.  To the extent that this
phrase leaves open the possibility for cases to go before international arbitra-
tors, as opposed to NLRC arbitrators, they would arguably not be strictly con-
strained by either set of national policies and may therefore be able to mediate
the competing U.S. and Philippine policies more effectively than either U.S.
courts or NLRC arbitrators.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Robert Wai argues, one risk of international arbitration is that it may
become “autopoietic,” meaning that the norms of the system would be gener-
ated from within, and be reinforced by, the system itself.240  As a closed sys-
tem, his argument goes, international arbitration would only imperfectly and
237 Brief of the Department of Labor and Employment of the Republic of the Philippines as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 4-8, Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th
Cir. 2005) (No. 03-15884).
238 See Bautista, 396 F.3d 1289; Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270 (5th Cir.
2002).
239 See Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1293 n.5; Francisco, 293 F.3d at 271 n.1.
240 Wai, supra note 178, at 258.
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indirectly interact with other systems or networks.  Ultimately, this limitation
would undermine the possibility that it might be able to provide a regulatory
function241 and obscure any role for national law.  There may be some varieties
of international arbitration, such as maritime or re-insurance arbitration, that
operate like the closed systems that Wai hypothesizes and are therefore subject
to such risks.  It is also true that the international arbitration system has ele-
ments that are self-reproducing and self-constructing.  However, because it
relies on support from national courts for enforcement of agreements and
awards, and accommodates the national interests in tradeoff for that support,
the generalized international arbitration system remains actively engaged with
national systems and other networks that operate at the global level.
National variations in consumer and employment protection have kept the
international arbitration system tied into national regulatory priorities.  Aided
by its own internal values and mechanisms produced by those values, interna-
tional arbitration appears poised to accommodate the competing interests that
arise in adjudication of claims by have-nots.  As a consequence, international
arbitration has the potential to operate as an instrument for developing fair and
efficient procedures for resolving diverse categories of disputes, for mediating
conflicting national laws and policies, for securing effective transnational regu-
lation, and for generating international public policy norms.  The arrival of the
have-nots will test the extent to which it is ready and committed to fulfill that
role.
241 See id. (“The autopoietic character of transnational business systems may undermine
hopes that the regulatory function might be contained within the new systems themselves.”
(citing Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames:  The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Sys-
tems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1997))).
